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Introduction           
 
Among many people there has always been a natural distrust towards lobbying. Fuelled 
by movies such as Casino Jack 1 , negative reports in newspapers on how lobbyists 
operate, and initiatives like the one announced by Lea Bouwmeester2, the general feeling 
towards this profession is usually not one of affection. Politicians and policy makers will 
therefore in public never admit to being influenced by a lobbyist or of having accepted 
anything that could be mistaken for a bribe. Lobbyists themselves do not help their 
reputations by staying reserved about the way they operate. 
 Their reputation aside, lobbyists are a part of our decision making process. In the 
Netherlands and in the European Union (EU). And since the EU has gained more and 
more power the focus of lobbyists has shifted from national to European. Not completely, 
but ever increasingly. This thesis will look towards the EU.  
 Consequently, the part that lobbyists play within the workings of the EU is worthy 
of examination. Not just what their role is or whether this is a good or a bad thing. But 
simply, how do they do it? However, this is a rather unyielding and diverse subject. Far 
too big to discuss in this thesis.  
 In order to make the subject more manageable it could be wise to look at a single 
case. I have chosen to put the focus on animal testing. A number of reasons are behind 
this choice, but we will come to that in due time. First let us look at the work that already 
has been done on this particular research subject. 
 
 Lobby is an illusive activity. Impossible to contain and hard to measure. 
Therefore, it is important to define it correctly. Especially, since the act of ‘lobbying’ is an 
integral part of this thesis.  
 Aspinwall and Greenwood have chosen to define ‘lobby’ as “the investment of 
resources by individuals or organisations and the bringing together of these individuals or 
organisations in the collective pursuit of a common interest, which may result in selective 
or collective benefits”3. This is quite similar to the one Van Schendelen uses. The “build-
up of unorthodox efforts to obtain information and support regarding a game of interest 
in order to eventually get a desired outcome from a power-holder”4. Both focus on how 
                                                             
1 Casino Jack (2010), directed by George Hickenlooper. Based on the Abramoff-scandal, which brought the 
practices, such as bribery, of lobbyists in Washington DC to light.  
2 Every legislative proposal should include a paragraph which contains all contacts policy makers had with lobbyists 
on the subject and what has been discussed. http://nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/385341-lobby-moet-
transparanter.html 
3 Greenwood and Aspinwall (1998), 11. 
4 Van Schendelen (2010), 48. 
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to take interest and turn it into a result. Van Schendelen differentiates from Aspinwall 
and Greenwood in broadening the definition by use of the term “unorthodox efforts” 
where Aspinwall and Greenwood only talk about “investment of resources”. Van 
Schendelen also names a power-holder, which Aspinwall and Greenwood do not. Here 
Van Schendelens definition is closer to the ones that are in use at the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP). The EC defines lobbying as 
“activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and 
decision-making processes of the European institution”5. However the EP is much more 
specific and defines lobbyists as “persons who wish to enter Parliament’s premises 
frequently with a view to supplying information to Members in their own interests or 
those of third parties” 6 . A bit too specific for this thesis. The definitions of Van 
Schendelen and Aspinwall and Greenwood both have their merits too, but it is the EC 
that came up with the one that suits the needs of this thesis best. The inclusion of the 
European institutions as the power-holder makes it more useable and clear than the 
others. Especially, since the European institution involved in the cases will not always be 
the same ones. And in this definition the ‘power-holder’ from Van Schendelen has a 
name. In short, the definition given by the EC is more specific than the ones given by 
Van Schendelen and Aspinwall and Greenwood, but not too specific like the one used by 
the EP.  
 The conduct of lobbying is, obviously, carried out by ‘lobbyists’. However, this is 
not the term that I will use in this thesis. Due to the before mentioned connotation that 
goes with it I will speak of ‘interest representatives’ instead. This has the added bonus of 
accurately describing what they are doing: representing an interest. Giving the discussion 
a less biased angle. I will however keep using the word ‘lobby’ to describe the activity. 
Resorting to an euphemism like Van Schendelen and Pauw7 did when they coined the 
term ‘public relations management’ does not seem useful. I already detach the people 
doing the lobbying from the conduct by naming them interest representatives. Besides, 
public relations management is less accurate in describing the conduct then interest 
representatives is in describing the people doing it.  
 Doing research on lobby is hard. Mainly because is not possible to quantify lobby.  
And because sometimes the multiple (horizontal and vertical) levels of decision making 
diffuse the relation between action and outcome so much that no matter from what side 
you might look at the subsequent developments the actual way in which the decision has 
unfolded still remains a mystery. Recreating all the different moments where an interest 
representative has tried to exercise influence is almost impossible. Even more so because 
                                                             
5 Carboni (2009), 11. 
6 European Parliament (2003), iv. 
7 Van Schendelen and Pauw (1998). 
 6
the people involved have no incentive in sharing the amount and depth of the contacts 
they have. Policy makers do not want to be known as someone who changes his or her 
opinions easily under pressure of interest representatives. Even though nowadays policy 
makers openly have an open door policy for everyone8. This is especially true for a neo-
corporatistic entity like the EU. Meaning that in theory all groups in a society are 
represented by so called peak associations who are able to enforce agreements they 
have made with the government upon their members. It combines elements of both 
corporatism and pluralism. In corporatism the government can coerce agreements with 
the corporations which represent society. In neo-corporatism the corporations are much 
less subordinate to the state. This is where pluralism comes in. The division of political 
power among pressure groups so as to guarantee that not all power will be held by a 
single political elite. Political power then is distributed among society, but the 
government still stands above the pressure groups and corporations. As a consequence 
the neo-corporatist state is less decentralized than the pluralist state.  
 But why would you even lobby? It happens in all societies. No matter how 
pluralistic, corporatistic, or otherwise they are. Van Schendelen and Pauw divided the 
reasons for interest representation into four categories. Want (when their is a lot to gain, 
when others make efforts, or following previous successes), necessity (the only way to 
change a current undesirable situation; lacking alternatives), potential (probability of 
additional partners and resources, or expecting a reasonable effectiveness and 
efficiency), and invitation (others seek their information or support)9.  
 In addition to this discussion I want to add the following question:  
 
How does the pharmaceutical industry try to protect its interests at the 
European Commission in a public case such as animal testing?  
 
 There are a number of aspects to this question. These are determined by the 
boundaries that I devised for this thesis. The first boundary is the actors that are 
involved. In this question that comes down to the pharmaceutical industry and the 
European Commission. The second boundary is the use of a case study. A case that is 
under the attention of the public. And the third boundary is the conduct of lobby and the 
protection of interests. In the following section I will explain these boundaries. 
 The first boundary I would like to discuss are the actors that are associated with 
this subject. There are many actors involved in the field this research question covers. 
The closer you look, the more you see. At this point I will not look very close. That will 
come later on. Easiest to define as actors are the pharmaceutical industry and the 
                                                             
8 Kok, Kramer and Van der Maas (2004). 
9 Schendelen and Pauw (1998), 13. 
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European Commission. Then when you look at the case there are the stakeholders 
involved in animal testing. Which are obviously the above mentioned, but also some 
other actors. 
 Here we come to an interesting point. A lot of stakeholders do not protect their 
own interests. They hire others to do this on their behalf: interest representatives. Often 
employed by a group of stakeholders.  
 The second boundary I have created is the use of a case study. Making use of a 
case study is a classical way to demarcate a research question. Exactly why I am using 
it. But it also has a big disadvantage. It is like walking around wearing winkers. You only 
see what is right in front of you. You are blind to the world outside your focus. In an 
attempt to attend to this problem I will sometimes bring in examples from an other case 
I worked on. A non public case. Direct-to-consumer-communications.  
 The many factors that are of influence on the development of this case need to be 
brought in perspective. Most of them will hardly be dealt with. For example, the technical 
progression that is of major importance to the replacement of animal tests by 
alternatives which do not rely on the use of animals. I will focus on the protection of 
interests and the issues that brings with it.  
 Having set these boundaries the next step is to establish how to answer my 
research question. The sub questions that I will deposit here will help me to get a 
satisfactory answer. 
In the first part of the thesis I will try to answer the following questions:  
 
‘Who are involved in the protection of the pharmaceutical industries interests at the 
European Commission?’,  
 
‘How does the European Unions policy making process work and what is the role of the 
European Commission in it?’, and  
 
‘What makes a public case different from other cases?’. 
 
 In the second part of the thesis I will take a more chronological approach. Taking 
not only the events that are of importance to the animal testing case into account, but 
also a description of the development of the European Union, how the European 
pharmaceutical industry has fared, and lobbying in general. The question that will be 
central to this part reads:  
 
‘Have events moved in favour of the pharmaceutical industry?’. 
 
 8
 In the third part the case study will be viewed at close range. Giving the historical 
context from which this case has developed. Bringing to the case study some depth and 
help lift it to a higher level. In doing so I try to get an answer to three questions:  
 
‘Where does the pharmaceutical industry stand on animal testing?’, 
 
‘What are the positions of the other actors in this case?’, and  
 
‘What is the role of ECHA in this case?’. 
 
 In the last part I shall look at the case study again, but now with the help of six 
themes. Themes derived from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). This framework 
has a couple of advantages in studying lobby. How it works and why I chose it will, of 
course, be explained in this part. The main question, however, will be:  
 
‘How can you describe the position of the pharmaceutical industry when you look at the 
resources used in the ACF?’. 
 
 Finally, I will combine the answers to these sub questions and attempt to answer 
the main research question. 
 Naturally, at this point I have some idea what that answer probably will be. But 
these assumptions have to be checked. Whether these are right on the money or totally 
misguided remains to be seen. For now, let us just see what these assumptions are.  
 My general hypothesis is that the pharmaceutical industry is able to use the 
connections they have cultivated over a long period to keep most issues under control. 
However, when a case, such as animal testing, goes public the pharmaceutical industry 
has to change tactics. Politicians and policy makers are usually sensitive to public outcry. 
I think that the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the recently 
implemented Cosmetics Directive are good examples of how public opinion can have an 
effect on the policy making process.  
 At the same time, the pharmaceutical industry must have adopted to the growing 
number of interest representatives in Brussels and the institutional changes within the 
European Union. Most importantly the initiatives to do something about the lack of 
transparency that surrounded the European Union.  
 The best way to test these assumptions is logically to by getting the answers to 
the questions I asked. And this exactly what I set out to do.  
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Part One; The Parameters         
 
This thesis will start off with a broad perspective that narrows down to the case study, 
just to widen the scope again towards the bigger picture. The broad perspective shall be 
build up by the description of the different actors, the policy making process and an 
introduction of the case that I will be using. The main goal of this part of the thesis is to 
create a context in which the case study takes place. It builds on the boundaries that 
have been set in the introduction. Being the actors, interest representation, and the case. 
 Because of these boundaries I have devised three sub questions that will be 
guiding for this part. The sub questions that will be answered in this part of the thesis 
are: ‘Who are involved in the protection of the pharmaceutical industries interests at the 
European Commission?’, ‘How does the European Unions policy making process work and 
what is the role of the European Commission in it?’, and ‘What makes a public case 
different from other cases?’. 
 
Who are involved? 
Let us start with the first of these three sub questions. Who are involved in the protection 
of the pharmaceutical industries interests at the European Commission? In the 
introduction I already partially answered this question. The actors that were seen in there 
were the pharmaceutical industry, the EC and other stakeholders involved in the policy 
making process concerned with animal testing. To clearly answer this sub question we 
have to look deeper. All three actors are still very vague entities. 
 In order to give these actors a bit more body it is prudent to look a bit closer at 
them. A good place to start is the pharmaceutical industry. An important thing we should 
keep in mind is that the pharmaceutical industry is sometimes hard to distinguish from 
the chemical industry. Companies like Akzo Nobel, Bayer or DSM have divisions that are 
involved in the pharmaceutical industry, but they produce mainly other products10. DSM 
for example is the biggest supplier for the pharmaceutical industry. Half of the worlds top 
twenty most sold medicines contain products coming from DSM11. Bayer is listed as a 
chemical company. Even though their pharmaceutical division is bigger than a lot of 
companies that are listed as pharmaceutical companies 12 . A list of the biggest 
pharmaceutical companies therefore is not as representative as it might look. The 
problem lies in the fact that the pharmaceutical industry has originated from the chemical 
industry. Since then they are closely linked. So close that in a report from Eurostat they 
                                                             
10 SOMO (2003), 7. 
11 Idem, 4. 
12 SOMO (2004), 14. 
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prove this link using statistics 13 . The chemical industry will settle where there is a 
pharmaceutical industry. Where the latter is small, the former will be small as well and 
visa versa. 
 The pharmaceutical industry is, however, a separate beast from the chemical 
industry. Unlike the chemical industry the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most 
influential actors on the field where it concerns lobbying the EC. So much so that 
Aspinwall and Greenwood in 1998 name it as “one of the most effective actors at the 
European level”14. More specifically the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Associations (EFPIA). A trade association that represents national trade associations and 
pharmaceutical companies with a special interest in research and development of new 
medicines. Aspinwall and Greenwoods research suggests “that the most effective 
European groups in terms of attracting members tend to be those in business sectors 
characterised by a relatively high degree of concentration with only a limited number of 
potential members; where the firms are multinational and bring with them experience of 
operating in a variety of regulatory environments and collective structures; and where 
sectoral definition is marked, limiting the danger of competition from members in other 
sectors whose interests diverge” 15 . This is part of what makes the pharmaceutical 
industry so influential and why I choose them. The pharmaceutical industry is 
experienced, has the means to operate on the desired level, and is successful. In 2005 
the British Parliament has taken a look at the pharmaceutical industry in the United 
Kingdom (UK). They concluded that the influence of the industry on the regulatory policy 
and process is strong and will increase, because the EU will take on more responsibilities. 
Suggesting that the hold that the pharmaceutical industry has over the EU is stronger 
than they have over the UK and that through the EU the pharmaceutical industry will 
force legislation upon the UK. More to the point, they noticed that it was the first time in 
over a hundred years that the British Parliament found it necessary to investigate the 
pharmaceutical industry16. A signal that the industry has, for a long time, been able to 
attend to its business without much interference from, or conflict with the UK 
government. In the Netherlands the pharmaceutical industry has moved without 
interruption as well. But recent events have put the spotlight on their involvement in the 
decision made by former health secretary Ab Klink to buy vaccinations in 200817. Many 
                                                             
13 Vekeman (2005), 4. 
14 Greenwood and Aspinwall (1998), 21.  
15 Ibid. 
16 House of Commons Health Committee (2005),77. 
17 A radio show, Argos, found that claims of professor Osterhaus, who had interests in vaccination producing 
companies, on the severity of the flu outbreak were highly overstated.  
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questioned the ties that his most prominent advisors, Roel Coutinho18 and Ab Osterhaus, 
have to the pharmaceutical industry. These examples show that the stakes are high, but 
the freedom of the sector quite large. Which makes it all the more interesting to see if 
these national examples are an indication of what is going on at the European level.  
 The pharmaceutical interest representatives do not lobby the entire apparatus of 
the EU. Specific institutions get more attention than others. And the EU has given them a 
role in the decision making process. Lobbying has become an important part of how 
policy is formed19. So important that the European Transparency Initiative of 200620 has 
been deemed necessary. A, non-obligatory, register that interest representatives in 
Brussels who participate in certain processes are recorded in. The question is where do 
they lobby? The easiest answer is: everywhere they can. But the most influential lobby is 
done at the top of the pyramid.  
 The EU policy making process is layered. At the top are the treaties. Member 
States have sovereignty, which makes the EU in essence no more than a collection of 
treaties between these Member States. A part from that they meet each other in the 
European Council. This institution sets the political direction of the EU, but has no 
legislative powers. Below that are three institutions. The Council of the European Union 
also represents the Member States governments on more specific subjects and can pass 
laws. And it is responsible for the foreign policy of the EU. The EP represents the citizens 
of the EU, is directly elected, scrutinizes other EU institutions, especially the EC, and 
passes laws. And the third institution is the EC. This functions as the day-to-day 
government of the EU. This makes it for the purpose of this thesis the most interesting 
institute. The reason is that most agencies, directorates and commissions have to report 
in one way or the other to the EC. And above the EC level national governments with all 
their peculiarities will fragment the process so much that the focus will shift to how 
different Member States interact instead of how to lobby them. 
 
                                                             
18 Professor Coutinho was critized by Hans van der Linden, a general practitioner, for overemphasizing the 
necessity and usefulness of vaccinating against cervical cancer. Coutinho was accused of doing so because he had 
ties to the pharmaceutical industry. On http://www.steunhuisartsinproces.nl/in-de-media Van der Linden posts all 
news items concerning this case.  
19 Kok, Kramer and Van der Maas (2004).  
20 EC European Transparency Initiative (2006). 
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How does the policy process work? 
This brings me to the second sub question. All these actors are in some way active in the 
policy making process. But how does the European Unions policy making process work 
and what is the role of the European Commission in it? 
 So far the EU’s policies can be divided into three different types, according to 
Sbragia and Stolfi 21 . Market-building policies, market-correcting policies and market-
cushioning policies.22 The market-building policies emphasize the liberalization and are 
generally regulatory. The creation of the Single Market is a good example of this. Market-
correcting policies aim to protect citizens and producers from market forces and have a 
redistributive nature. The pharmaceutical market is highly regulated in this way to make 
sure developers get a chance to earn their investments back. Market-cushioning policies 
intend to mitigate the harm that economic activity can bring to individuals. Keeping 
prices at a level which consumers can afford, for example. The first is usually greeted 
with excitement by the industry, whereas the –correcting and –cushioning might not. In 
the case of animal testing the main focus has been on market-building. Regulating the 
reduction of animal testing and the promotion of alternatives.  
 One way of, for example, softening the blow of a market-cushioning policy could 
be to use the comitology to its fullest. As mentioned before the fine tuning happens here. 
Taking the sting out of a policy as well. It is a difficult and diffuse subject to get into and 
comitology as an issue has been talked about a lot recently. The main concern it carried 
with it had to do with transparency. As we shall see with the case on direct-to-consumer-
communications. Outsiders were very critical on this point. They wanted to know what 
happened after a measure was decided upon. Annually 60 texts are adopted via co-
decision, while up to 3000 decisions are taken by comitology groups23. So there was 
definitely something to talk about. The EC would invite (private) parties to send experts 
who could be put into committees that worked out the details of legislation they had 
decided upon. These experts then, could have great influence on how this would turn out. 
Without having the necessary checks and balances24. Because this system is efficient and 
cheap the EC was not very enthusiastic to change it. The EP was. With their strengthened 
powers they wanted more control and got it. Slowly the system opened up. Backroom 
politics are no longer one of the main concerns of the EP. Part of the solution to this 
problem seemed to be that the EU is based on the consensus principle. Rather than the 
winner-takes-all principle which is prevalent in the United States (USA). A consequence is 
                                                             
21 Sbraga and Stolfi (2008). 
22 Mossialos (2010), 2. 
23 Guéguen (2007), 113. 
24 See the works of Mark Rhinard, Renaud Dehousse and others for more information on this subject.  
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that a potential debilitation problem, such as the discussion around comitology, is solved 
without going into extremes or actors overruling each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Co-decision flow chart25.  
 
 To see how this works we have to take a good look at the policy making process 
in the EU. At what point do interest representatives try to intervene in the decision 
making process. The decision making process has numerous moments in which an 
interest representative can try to do his or her job. And although it has changed quite a 
bit since the Single European Act (SEA), above is a scheme on what the co-decision 
procedure looks like today. This is not the only procedure where the interest 
                                                             
25 http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/diagram_en.htm 
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representatives can get involved. It is one of the most important ones. Primary law, for 
example, is left out. These are the treaties that national governments will sign with each 
other. Like the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of the European Union (TEU or more 
commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty) or the SEA.  
 
 Secondary law is made using the co-decision procedure where necessary. It starts 
with a ‘draft phase’. The EC has a reason and a proposal for a new piece of legislation. 
This measure will, of course, fall within the mandate of the EC as set out by the treaties. 
In this phase a lot can and cannot happen. Before the proposal is formally on the table 
and the ‘consultation’ has begun nothing has happened. New legislation can be stopped 
here from ever becoming legislation fairly easy. On the other hand, this is the point 
where an interest representative can ‘help’ the EC with useful suggestions or texts. When 
a proposal has been put forward by the EC the ‘consultation’ will begin. National 
parliaments of Member States, the EP and some committees have to be consulted on the 
proposal. If necessary a second reading by the EP will take place. The EP can then 
propose amendments. Lobbying in this stage has to be focussed on those amendments 
or on a total rejection of the proposal. When the Council does not agree with the 
amendments of the EP a Conciliation Committee has to be formed. This will start a 
conciliation procedure and is aimed at getting both parties on board on a joint text. For 
about fifteen percent of all legislation that is formed this is the route that is determined 
under the co-decision procedure.  
 The lions share of laws are delegated and discretionary. These consist of the 
detailed legislation that is needed to get the secondary laws implemented. This is the 
comitology I mentioned earlier. Since the co-decision procedure can take up to three 
years26 it can be very interesting for an interest representative to get to the proposal, 
with all its amendments, accepted by all parties as soon as possible. Preferably before a 
second reading is necessary. Because once within the bosoms of the comitology a lot can 
happen and corrected. Amongst others, Mark Rhinard27 and Daniel Guéguen28 have done 
a lot of research on this particular part of the policy making process. The technical quality 
of Rhinards work on the more controversial aspects of the system, like the democratic 
and transparency deficits, are very useful for anyone that wants to look into this 
particular part of EU policy making procedures. Guéguen on the other hand makes an 
effort to open up the subject to a broader audience. Making his work easier to follow, but 
also less accurate (he acknowledges this himself). He explains, for example, that there 
are a few people who are able to work the system to their advantage. Mainly, because 
                                                             
26 Carboni (2009), 17. 
27 Rhinard (2002). 
28 Guéguen (2011). 
 15
they are doing it for a long time and are able to spend a lot of time and resources at it. 
Industrial interest representatives, as one of the oldest and well endowed players on the 
field, are usually more experienced than their more recent counterparts, like non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).  
 How these interest representatives actually do this is under the investigation of 
many people29. Not least by them selves as a publication by Burson-Marsteller (B-M) 
proves. In 2009 this public relations and communications firm wrote a guide on effective 
lobbying30. At the base of this guide was an enquiry that was designed to “identify 
perception among policy elites about lobbying and lobbyists”31. Proving that they practice 
what they preach, B-M found the vice-president of the EC, Siim Kallas, willing to write 
the foreword of this guide. Apparently a man of his stature, who will find himself often 
targeted by interest representatives, respects them enough to not only write a foreword 
for them, but also recognize them as a valuable asset to the decision making process32. 
The interest representatives are not the only ones who try to influence people and 
organisations. Kallas has an agenda too. He pushes for registration of interest 
representatives in the Register for Interest Representatives (a result from the European 
Transparency Initiative) 33 . Supported by the authors transparency runs through the 
guide as one of the main issues in lobbying. Being transparent equals, especially in the 
northern countries, a more trustworthy management. The surveys B-M did found that 
lobbying is seen as constructive input to decision making and sharing of expertise, but on 
the negative side they found that a lack of transparency and biased information were 
mentioned often. In 2005 a report from B-M showed that companies and NGOs were 
equally effective. However, now (2009) there are a number of fields where the industry is 
perceived to be much more effective. One of these fields is the pharmaceutical industry. 
Worryingly, one quarter of the respondents mention unethical inducements to be 
frequent. By which they mean corruption, an apparent lack of transparency or 
aggressiveness34. 
 
Public opinion 
Now it is time to bring in the case study that plays such a big part in this thesis. I have 
chosen for animal testing as the subject of my case. One of the major reasons for this 
choice was the fact that animal testing is a very public case. Which immediately brings 
up a question. What makes a public case different from other cases?  
                                                             
29 For more on this you could look at the works of Rinus van Schendelen or Erik van Venetië.  
30 Burson-Marsteller (2009). 
31 Idem, 7. 
32 Idem, 4. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Idem, 8. 
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 Public opinion can be a very powerful weapon in the hands of a capable interest 
representative. Access can be forced by getting the public to demand that policy makers 
listen to your beliefs. Public opinion can help to get the policy makers and other coalitions 
to sway to your beliefs more easily as well. Some have become much better at 
influencing the public opinion than others. Playing on emotions that are already present 
in the public is one way to put the policy makers in a position that they are forced to act. 
At the same time the public opinion can be a powerful break on developments. Near the 
end of the eighties the public opinion favoured the EU. Treaties like the SEA and 
Maastricht helped boost confidence in the cooperation. Since the introduction of the euro, 
however, euro scepticism has been rising. More and more further integration was slowed 
down by governments who were held back by the public opinion at home. Now the 
economic crisis is hitting hard governments are acting again. Their constituencies expect 
them to do so and make sure that the promised economic recovery is assured.  
 That the public opinion can be manipulated into your favour by throwing more 
money at it than your opponents is false. John Wilson describes this claim quite 
thoroughly in an article on the influence of lobby groups on public opinion in 
environmental policy 35 . He starts of by recognizing that in the 2002 election cycle 
environmental groups spend much less on political contribution in the USA than private 
actors. Respectively 1.4 million dollars against 57.8 million36. This did not mean that the 
environmental groups were having a significantly smaller impact on environmental policy. 
They were spending their money elsewhere. Preferring to influence public opinion 
instead37. He found that a largely uninformed public will remain uninformed when parties 
polarize. Viewing their, informed, claims with scepticism.  
   
 The parameters that have been presented here shall shape the rest of this thesis. 
The way that the pharmaceutical industry is closely related to the chemical industry and 
the workings of the EU policy making process show how I shall approach the case. Just 
like the role of the public opinion. Using the public at your advantage can be very 
effective, but is no guarantee for success. The public does not always care as much as 
you do.  
 In the next part of this thesis I will put the focus even more on the pharmaceutical 
industry. Working up to animal testing in the process while providing a valuable context.  
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36 Idem, 2. 
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Part Two; The Context         
 
In this second part of the thesis I will show how the European Union has developed, how 
the European pharmaceutical industry has fared, and how interest representation in 
Brussels has changed. The sub question that will be answered in this part of the thesis is: 
‘Have events moved in favour of the pharmaceutical industry?’. This will include 
situations and developments that the pharmaceutical industry has no power over.  
 As the start of this rather chronological account I have chosen the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). Beginning a story on the EU with the ECSC is almost 
classic. There are good reasons to start earlier with efforts of people like Guiseppe 
Mazzini and Victor Hugo or the Pan-Europa Movement of Coudenhove-Kalergi. The ideas 
of an united Europe and acknowledging this as a way to prevent future wars was already 
well established in intellectual circles when plans for the ECSC were made. One of the 
main goals behind the ECSC was to prevent a war between France and Germany (or any 
of the other member states38). To integrate these countries in such a way that war would 
be very unprofitable no matter what the outcome. The ECSC was established in 1951 
with the Treaty of Paris, but its initiator, Robert Schuman, had much larger plans. On 9 
May 1950 he made the Schuman Declaration public, and thereby creating the ECSC. But 
his declaration promoted a step by step creation of an unified Europe through democratic 
means. Until this day that process is still under way.  
 After this noble start the main drive behind the steps towards further integration 
was economic in its nature. The Treaty of Rome and the subsequent creation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) show that it did not take long before economic 
motives had taken the lead. Most industries reacted quite distant and were hardly 
interested in the ECSC or any of the institutional endeavour that went along with it, 
except of course the ones directly affected by the ECSC. Networking activities during the 
first decades were not so much focussed on policy change as they were on the 
networking facet itself. Institutional arrangements and industrial programmes of the 
Community were of secondary importance.  
 The medical community adopted in this period the Helsinki Declaration39 through 
the World Medical Association. They did this in order to produce a form of successful self 
regulation. Building upon a tradition of annual meetings since 1947, the member 
organisations declared that their physicians were bound to uphold the standards set out 
in the Declaration, even if local legislation does not demand this of them. Over the years 
the Declaration has been revised and clarified multiple times. However there are other 
problems. A lot of them have to do with research and the patents that result from that. 
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For example, Bhandari et al. conclude that trails financed by the industry are more likely 
to result in significant pro-industry findings than if they were financed in any other way40.  
 I bring this example of international organisation from the medical profession into 
the story to show that even though initiatives like these run parallel to the development 
of the EU that does not have to imply any form of interaction. Talks remained very 
informal and stakeholders saw each other as partners in this new enterprise. “Although 
the EU initially shunned European big business during the Monnet years, it is clear that 
the European Commission has played an important role since the 1960s in encouraging 
the mobilisation of large firm associations” 41 . This constant exchange between 
governmental officials and industry representatives define a period that Daniel Guéguen42 
calls the time of construction. Full of enthusiasm this period lasted until the beginning of 
the 70s.  
 Though this optimism was not to last. The 70s and 80s became the low tide. The 
development of the EU is slowing down and the initial enthusiasm is gone. Interest 
representatives take on a lower profile and maintain their informal ways of doing 
business. It is Jacques Delors that changes this. His efforts to establish a single market 
puts the EU back on track and reinvigorates that initial enthusiasm. Important to note is 
that the single market was wholeheartedly endorsed by the European Round Table of 
Industrialists43, then arguably the most influential interest group in Brussels. Typical for 
the change in the way interest representatives operate is the realisation that a lot of 
power has left the national governments and has taken residence in Brussels. Therefore, 
so will the lobbyists. They become much more aggressive in their tactics, better informed 
technically and rely on a bigger, global network. Increasing competition from other 
interest representatives leads them to try and get the best factual arguments. According 
to Guéguen technical credibility becomes crucial and the only way to be taken seriously. 
And therefore the only way to be listened to44. Maria Green Cowles describes the groups 
near the end of the nineties as tending to be “small, direct-firm organisations dedicated 
to shaping the agenda on specific Community issues through the use of organised, well-
financed lobbying schemes” 45 . Amid all this a problem arises for the interest 
representatives. They were still arranged as they were in the 70s. The classical European 
association, formed around sectoral representation, had a monopoly of representation 
with the European institutions. But the raising stakes for the industry and the growing 
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competition amongst themselves changes the balance while the increasing number of 
members the associations have to represent clog their wheels. Making it much harder 
and more time consuming to get consensus on issues. Usually ending up with 
compromises that did not fulfil the wishes of all members. In a reaction the members 
start to lobby on their own account. Undermining the authority of their trade association, 
but strengthening their own position. Nonetheless, they kept their membership of the 
trade association. Knowing what your competition does and perhaps being able to 
participate in a joint effort has its advantages.  
 In 1985 the Commission Delors came with a white paper on the internal market, 
which led to the SEA46 and enveloped 279 legislative measures that had to be taken in 
order to be able to complete the internal market by 31 December 1992. The SEA was 
signed in The Hague on 17 February 1986 by nine member states (Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and Western-
Germany), closely followed by Denmark, Italy and Greece on 28 February 1986 and 
became effective 1 July 1987.  
 For the pharmaceutical industry this meant not just the same as for every other 
industry. The breaking down of trade barriers within the EU had a major effect on all 
trade. Pharmaceutical products had an extra dimension. Because healthcare systems 
were still nationally organised and the market for many pharmaceutical products was 
attuned to these specific conditions, the transition was not smooth. Cases such as those 
of Kohll47 and Decker48 at the European Court of Justice in 1998 are excellent examples 
of this. Both gentlemen had made use of services that their health insurance would have 
paid for if they had done so in Luxemburg, where they came from. However, they did not 
and sued the insurance company. The European Court of Justice ruled that this was in 
violation of the free movement of goods and services under EU law, and that EU law 
would supersede national law. In the end they are a testament to how far the EU had 
progressed. It showed that EU law had much more power over national law than was 
previously thought. What made the situation more complicated was that the health 
sector was not included into the EU Services Directive. The directive that aims to break 
down trade barriers for services. In 2005 it was added to the Open Method of 
Coordination procedures conducted by the Social Protection Committee. Health related 
lobby groups had successfully kept health out of the Services Directive. Claiming the 
sector was to unique and that Member States would have difficulty managing their health 
systems with the additional EU oversight. The EC kept on pushing for harmonization on 
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the grounds of the SEA in connection with the cross border trade in medicines, but 
Member States have, so far, used the subsidiarity principle to thwart this. Under the SEA 
medicines are still treated as industrial goods49 . The problem with this is that each 
Member State wants to control the prices of medicines sold to the consumer. As a result 
prices differ greatly within the EU. Traders will buy medicines in a country where they are 
cheap and sell them to pharmacies in a country where they are expensive. Health 
insurance companies will reimburse the prescription drug, at a rate determined by the 
government. But the pharmaceutical companies cannot sell the medicines they produce 
at the same price the traders will, because the government will not let them50. This 
practice is also known as parallel trade or grey-market imports and an important issue 
for the pharmaceutical industry that they try to address to the EC.  
 The SEA meant a lot of changes in the EEC-Treaty. The increase in power of the 
EC and the EP, the reformed decision making procedure of the Council and the extension 
of the responsibilities of the Communities were the most notable changes. The treaty 
also formalised the summits of the Heads of State and Government into the European 
Council. Still, this newly created institution did not have any official powers. But it is one 
of those glimpses into the long term vision of the treaty. The same goes for the 
mentioning of the creation of a European Union in the preamble of the treaty. 
 For the Council the reformed decision making procedure mainly came down to the 
introduction of qualified majority voting (qmv) instead of unanimity for all measures. This 
was supposed to make the procedure easier and especially more effective. Only 
measures concerning taxation, free movement of persons and the rights and interests of 
employees were still decided by unanimity.  
 In an attempt to tackle the ‘democratic deficit’51 the EP was from then on included 
in the concluding of association agreements. More importantly, the cooperation 
procedure was introduced, which gave the Parliament a far stronger position in the 
legislative process. However, this procedure is only applicable in cases where the Council 
acts by qmv and with the exception of environmental matters. On a judicial level the SEA 
created the foundations for a Court of First Instance. All cases, except (references for) 
preliminary rulings requested by Member States or institutions, may be presented here. 
 More importantly, the objective of the SEA was formulated in Article 8A as “an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
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and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. All to be 
established before 31 December 1992. To get the less developed regions up to speed the 
Community has the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the 
European Regional Development Fund to intervene. On the high end of the economy the 
Treaty provides for the implementation of framework multi annual programmes that can 
be unanimously adopted by the Council. Research and technical development should 
benefit from these programmes and become more competitive at an international level.  
 For the pharmaceutical, and other industries, this meant that decision making at 
the EU-level became much more dynamic and effective. Opening up an internal market 
within six years and the existence of those funds gave the interest representatives of 
various industries enormous future possibilities. As did the following treaties and reforms. 
The first time the SEA was amended was with the TEU of 1992. Again with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997, the Treaty of Nice of 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. The 
TEU 52  created the three pillars on which the EU would be build: the European 
Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Cooperation in the Fields of 
Justice and Home Affairs. Another significant advancement was the laying down of a 
procedure and a timetable for the Economic Monetary Union with a single currency. 
Working towards becoming an efficient, but democratic community the principle of 
subsidiarity was introduced and the EP got more power in the legislative process through 
co-decision procedure. On top of that the Committee of the Regions was established in 
order to give the local and regional interests a voice.  
 The TEU had some big consequences for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Consequences that they did foresee with the SEA. One of these was that the entire EU 
had to implement and uphold the same patenting laws since 199253. The climax of a 
development that was going on for over three decades. 
 As a controversial subject the patent regulations have had their profound effect on 
the pharmaceutical industry. Champions of these regulations will defend their argument 
with the claim that research is so expensive that without the reassurance of a patent 
developing new medicines would not be worth the trouble. Considering that it takes 
pharmaceutical companies about thirteen years to produce and patent a new kind of 
medicine. After which the patent lasts for twelve, in some cases up to twenty, years. In 
that time the company has to make its money back54. A lot of money. Especially when 
you take into account that a patent is usually given years before a drug enters the 
market. On average the cost of bringing a single drug to the market will be around 800 
million dollars. Because of this no industry is more depended on patents than the 
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pharmaceutical industry55. Although other calculations, as seen below, will only go up to 
400 million dollars, the argument still stands. It is incredibly expensive to develop a 
medicine and the success of one medicine has to pay for the failure of many others.  
 
Overview of different stages of drug development56 
phase description test 
group 
size 
cumulative 
time (years) 
success 
rate 
cost  
($ mln) 
pre-
clinical 
identify benefits and risks to 
participants in clinical trails 
- 1-2 1% <1 
phase I 
test safety, dosage range and side 
effects on volunteers 
20-80 3-4 10% 0,5-1,5 
phase II 
test effectiveness and safety on 
patients 
100-300 5-6 40% 2-100 
phase III 
confirm effects on patients, 
compare with other drug 
1000-3000 8-9 80% 
30-400 
approval - - 10 95% 
 
 At Bristol-Myers Squibb the turnover of three medicines dropped 90 percent in the 
first quarter after the patent ran out. Mostly due to competition of generic medicines57. 
That claim, however, is mainly true for large companies. A historical analysis of patents 
in this branch of industry tells a different story 58 . Prior to the First World War the 
introduction of patent protection in France was a reason for French chemical companies 
to move to Switzerland en masse. At that time the pharmaceutical industry was a part of 
the chemical industry. Since patents were forbidden in Switzerland this was the logical 
way to go. So many companies did this that on the eve of the war there was no chemical 
industry in France anymore. Apart from that the Swiss chemical industry was doing well 
for a few other reasons ass well. Contrary to England and France, from 1900 to 1915 the 
Swiss were catching up with the Germans. Thanks to collaborating with the German 
industry, specialization, quality, permissiveness and neutrality 59 . At that time the 
chemicals industry in the USA was underdeveloped and because patent protection the 
USA was forced to import chemicals from German companies, which held most patents. 
The German market was very competitive, innovative and highly productive, and 
successful on the European markets where patents were not protected60. So successful 
that with “reference to the organic chemistry industry in particular, more than half the 
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total of the chemical production exported by Germany in 1912 corresponded to dyestuffs, 
perfumes or drugs, and the sales abroad of these products exceeded the total figure of 
exports in the rest of the world.”61 The Anglo-Saxon markets were not at the same level. 
Boldrin and Levine think that this has to do with the fact that they do have a large 
degree of patent protection. The two World Wars made sure that German know-how was 
easily spread among the victors and their chemical companies could catch up with the 
Germans62. Already in 1924 Germany’s share in the world trade had dropped to 40%63.  
 Patents have the drawback that they slow down the spread of knowledge. For 
example, Peter Ringrose, the chief scientific officer at Bristol-Myers Squibb, told the New 
York times that there were “more than 50 proteins possibly involved in cancer that the 
company was not working on because the patent holders either would not allow it or 
were demanding unreasonable royalties.” 64  Keep in mind here that Ringrose is 
complaining that others are not sharing their knowledge with him, but he is not saying 
that he wants to share his knowledge with them.  
 In 1978 Italy introduced patents on medicines under pressure of large 
multinationals. This lead to a big growth in the number of medicines that were invented 
in Italy, compared to the previous decades65. A consequence was that the market in Italy 
was first dominated by small and medium enterprises (464 in 1976) and now the big 
players took over (335 small and medium enterprises in 1985). The Italian companies 
lost the battle against the big foreign companies. Their method of copy and improve was 
not possible anymore66.  
 In the USA it was for a long time already possible to patent the drug as well as 
the process of making it. In Europe the first was not possible until quite recently67. In 
France that started in 1959 for some pharmaceutical products and was completed in 
1978 for all pharmaceutical products. The Germans were already there in 1967. Even 
Switzerland yielded in 1977. Italy was prior to the patent regulations the fifth producer in 
the world and the seventh exporter. In the beginning of the 80s they lost that position68. 
Spain had to introduce patenting because it joined the EEC in 1986. That this did not 
stop the European companies from investing in research and development is shown by 
the amount they spend on it. In 1990 the EU spend more on research and development 
in the pharmaceutical industry than anywhere else. And it kept on growing. In the USA 
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the spending grew as well, and much faster. In 2005 the expenditures in the EU had 
tripled, but the USA had grown even faster and were now the ones who spend the most 
on research and development69. Despite the increase in spending up to the nineties, the 
number of patents granted and new drugs approved has actually diminished and 
development cycles are lengthening70.  
 A very informative figure in this discussion is that the cost of actually producing a 
drug, which are never disclosed, is estimated only five percent of the selling price71. The 
bigger companies have a hard time earning their money back. Bad research results over 
a longer period have lead to a change in tactics. More money is being spend on 
marketing and less on research. Cutting the cost of research can be done by taking a 
successful medicine of which the patent is about to run out and change it enough to get a 
new patent. This new medicine will than replace the old one and effective marketing will 
make sure that physicians will prescribe the new drug. This tactic is usually called a “me-
too” drug72. According to Boldrin and Levine this is detrimental to the pharmaceutical 
industry. In their opinion money that is spend on a “me-too” drug is wasted73. It could be 
spend on new medicines. However, the top twenty pharmaceutical companies had almost 
700 new medicines under development in 200474. Harmonizing patent regulations has big 
consequences as we could see. Showing that it can be crucial for the pharmaceutical 
companies to be involved in the policy making process. After all, being able to steer this 
process in a favourable direction could mean that you retain a profitable local position 
which otherwise would be lost to powerful outsiders.  
 Whether or not patent protection is a good thing is still under debate. The 
arguments in favour of patent protection are compelling. Ensuring companies that they 
have a good chance to recoup their investments. But the competitiveness of markets 
where there is much less or no patent protection and the effects it has on the spread of 
knowledge make it a debate that could easily take another decade before it is resolved. 
For the time being patent protection seems safe. Pharmaceutical companies are still quite 
capable in explaining that they need the patents to pay for all their research failures and 
that without them development of new medicines would slow down to a crawl.  
 In the mean time the integration of the EU was still under way. Although the 
Treaty of Amsterdam75 was far more modest in its accomplishments. Mostly, it came 
down to deepening and strengthening existing policy. Just as the TEU it entailed more 
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qmv. And the co-decision procedure that was introduced then, was now extend in its 
applicability.  
 What also changed was that the EU finally got its mandate over public health. Not 
that this previously held the EU back much. In an attempt to improve public health the 
EC introduced eight points of interest in 1993. The Communication on the Framework for 
Action in the Field of Public Health can be seen as a flight forward by the EC. The eight 
points (health promotion, health monitoring, communicable disease, cancer, rare 
diseases, injury prevention, pollution related diseases and drug prevention) were chosen 
because of their urgency and possibilities in case of a EU mandate. Meanwhile, the EU 
was since 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam, capable of complementing national policies, 
but is barred from harmonization. Limiting the EU to establishing public health 
programmes and incentives in the health policy field. It took until 2002 before it was 
agreed upon that health care systems share common principles of solidarity, equity, and 
universality. But no concrete action was undertaken76. In 2005 in the UK companies 
could still choose to have their drugs licensed either for the UK market, through the 
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, or for the entire European 
market, through the European Medicines Agency77 . To avoid any hint of favouritism 
members of the European Medicines Agency are not permitted to have any ties to the 
pharmaceutical industry.78 In 2003 the EC did present the first integrated approach in the 
form of the Public Health Programme 2003-2008. Directly followed by a second 
programme which runs until 2013. This programme has three objectives; improve 
citizens health security, promote health and generate and disseminate health 
information. The scale of the programme can be seen in the budget: 321.5 million euros. 
 The start of the first Public Health Programme was no accident in 2003. As these 
things never are. On 1 February 2003 the Treaty of Nice entered into force79. A direct 
consequence of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in preparation of further enlargement of 
the European Union this treaty aimed to do something about the size and the 
composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, extension of qmv 
and adjust the enhanced cooperation system. They did this by giving the votes of the 
more populated Member States more weight in the Council, giving the President of the 
EC more powers, divide the tasks of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
again between them, extend the co-decision procedure and change the allocation of the 
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seats in the EP. These changes made it possible to go towards the integrated approach 
laid down in the Public Health Programme. 
 Before that health related issues were already greatly discussed and policies 
adopted. One such issue is a great example of the dealings between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the EC. It shows how well these two actors can, if they desire, work 
together and how opponents can be put on the sidelines. Interesting is that it begins with 
a very assertive EC. 
 The Pharma Review was in 2001 an initiative of the Directorate General (DG) 
Enterprise, who was (and still is) responsible for drafting pharmaceutical legislation, as a 
programme to revise pharmaceutical legislation. It would give the pharmaceutical 
industry limited opportunities to approach the general public with information on certain 
medicines for a period of five years. The EP and Council blocked the proposal, because 
they feared it would lead to direct-to-consumer-advertising.  
 The EC, however, wanted new legislation on this subject. Current legislation was 
obsolete. The spread of the internet brought with it a paradox. Producers of medicines 
were not allowed to provide information on these medicines to consumers, but everyone 
else could. To be able to reach its goal of getting reliable, good quality, non-biased 
information to the consumer the EC asked the EP to draft a proposal.  
 At the same time another initiative took of. Partially to insure that the topic 
remained on the table and would not be forgotten. Enterprise Commissioner Erkki 
Liikanen and Health Commissioner David Byrne set up the ‘High Level Group on 
Innovation and Provision of Medicines in the EU’ or more commonly known as the G10 
Medicines Group80. The goal was to explore ways of improving competitiveness in Europe 
while encouraging high levels of health protection. The group met on 26 March 2001 for 
the first time and consisted of thirteen health and industry ministers from five Member 
States, representatives from different sectors of industry, mutual funds and a specialist 
in patient issues. After two additional meetings and one year the group reported to EC 
President Romano Prodi. It had divided its work into three agenda areas: the provision of 
medicines to patients; the single market, competition and regulation; and innovation. 
One of the aspects that made this initiative work was, in the words of Mossialos, that the 
“rationale and remit of the Group came in part from DG Sanco’s role as co-initiator”81. 
Both initiatives complemented each other very well, because the G10 Medicines Group 
could bypass the formal channels and institutions that the Pharma Review had to go 
through 82 . Together reforming legislation on a broad basis. The involvement of the 
stakeholders through the G10 Medicines Group made it a success.  
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 In contrast to, for example, the Bangemann Rounds 83 . In 1996 and 1997 
Commissioner Martin Bangemann consulted the industry in two round table talks. The 
problem he faced was in large part due to the expectations from the industry. They 
wanted to talk about parallel trade, but this was protected by the Treaty and therefore 
impossible to change. Disappointed, the industry representatives did not want to consider 
the proposals to regulate the pharmaceutical market in such a way that price-fixing 
might become unnecessary. An attitude which the EC could not understand84.  
 The G10 Medicines Group led to the establishment of the Pharma Forum in 2005 
(until 2008). An attempt to keep all stakeholders involved in the process and a follow-up 
to the G10 Medicines Group85. The Pharma Forum was the first time that all stakeholders, 
EC, Member States and representatives of the EP gathered to discuss healthcare policy. 
The goal was mainly to improve the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry and 
ensure that patients would have access to medicines within a sustainable healthcare 
budget. On top of that, the Pharma Forum involved a higher number of stakeholders than 
the G10 Medicines Group had. In December 2008 the DG Enterprise was confident 
enough (after public consultations and impact assessment) that it released a draft 
proposal. Which was to be included in the Pharma Package. The Pharma Package is a 
popular name for a series of measures that were put together by the EC and concerned 
the pharmaceutical industry. On closer examination, however, there is hardly any link in 
what was discussed in the Pharma Forum and the legislation put forward in the Pharma 
Package86. All difficult topics which the Pharma Forum was supposed to resolve were 
largely kept out of the Pharma Package. Mainly, because the focus of the Pharma 
Package were put on the other subjects, like improving the safety of medicines and 
fighting counterfeit medicines87. Nonetheless, there is a definite change to be seen in the 
measure of involvement of the pharmaceutical industry in the Bangemann Rounds and in 
the Pharma Forum. Even if the talks themselves do not always have the result the parties 
would like them to have.  
 Separate from this another issue was tackled. At the basis of this issue was the 
threat of generic medicines. These medicines will enter the market when a patent has 
ran out and are usually substantially cheaper. The difference with the “me-too” drugs is 
that these are so similar to the first drug that a new patent will not be issued. The main 
producers of these generic medicines can be found in lower cost countries, such as India, 
China or South Africa. Sometimes even in the same factories where the brand medicines 
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are made. A not uncommon situation, since the production of medicines has moved to 
these countries in the last decades. Even the research and development departments are 
moving, slowly, here as well88. The pool of educated employees is growing in these 
countries and they are much cheaper. Furthermore, the pressure from animal rights 
groups and strict regulations can be added to the push factors89.  
 One way to arm themselves against generic medicines is marketing is to spend 
huge sums of money on marketing. This way the companies that produce brand drugs 
can still keep an expensive, patented medicine (or its patented replacement) on the 
market and on to the prescription pads of physicians. If possible these expensive 
medicines will even be prescribed after the patent has run out, because physicians are 
used to prescribing them. Even though cheaper generic medicines are available. Effective 
marketing can achieve this90. Of course the chance of this happening is much bigger in 
high income countries. In the low income countries the drug that is the cheapest has the 
largest chance of being prescribed, because most people simply cannot afford the brand 
drug. As a result 90 percent of the money that is spend on research and development of 
new medicines is aimed at researching diseases that are prevalent in high income 
countries. Only ten percent is spend on diseases that are prevalent in low income 
countries. Whereas these diseases make up 90 percent of deaths91.  
 In an attempt to make sure developments such as these would not hurt the 
competitiveness of the research and development sector in the EU the Lisbon Strategy 
was adopted in 2000. Its aim was to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. In 2002 the Council added the aim to 
spend at least three percent of their GDP on research. Of which two thirds should be paid 
by businesses. That goal was a bit over ambitious. In 2006 only Finland and Sweden had 
reached this goal. On average the EU could not even reach two percent. After the Lisbon 
Strategy was re-launched in 2005 it was time to do more. In 2006 the Member States 
appointed knowledge and innovation one of the four priority areas of the EU.  
 But first the EU needed to reform. After the failure of the European Constitution92 
reforms where especially overdue and many Member States were since then pushing for 
another format for these reforms. One of the main reasons for this urgency was a result 
of the growth of the number of Member States. The apparatus of the EU was never built 
to service this many Member States and it was getting harder and harder to make sense 
                                                             
88 SOMO (2004), 15. 
89 House of Commons (2005), 16. 
90 SOMO (2004), 14. 
91 Idem, 23. 
92 France and The Netherlands voted in a referendum against the proposed Constitution. For more on this issue: 
Lanting (2005). 
 29
out of the growing pile of treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon93 would bring this reform. One of 
the things they changed was the voting system in the Council. They redefined qmv and 
effectively abolished weighted voting. At the same time the powers of the EP were 
increased further and the citizens initiative was created. 
 Meanwhile healthcare costs are rising throughout the decades and governments 
are concerned about this. Their policies to stimulate generic medicines are contrary to 
what they industry would like to see. Marketing efforts in vain, the market for generic 
medicines is growing and competition in the pharmaceutical industry is growing too94. As 
a result pharmaceutical companies have started to adopt the strategy of buying up 
competitors and are more and more concentrating on their core business. Selling off 
other activities95. The strategy seems to work. In 2009 the production of pharmaceutical 
and medicinal products rose by 11 percent despite the economic crisis. A great recovery 
since 2008 saw a little decline. The EU-27 was in 2009 the biggest trader of 
pharmaceutical products with 123.3 billion euros of which 65 percent was export. The 
second largest was the USA with 74.9 billion euros. Quite a big gap. In the period 2000 
to 2009 the USA was the main trade partner of the EU-27 and amounted in 2009 to 35 
percent of extra EU-27 trade. Over this period the export and import of the EU-27 more 
than doubled. Starting at 52.1 billion in 200096. The status of the USA as the most 
important trading partner of the EU-27 is emphasized by the fact that the value of the 
exports towards the USA have increased by more than 150 percent in the period from 
2000 to 2007, dropped a little in 2008 and recovered in 2009. After the USA Switzerland 
is the most important trading partner for the EU-27. Still that trade holds only one third 
of what the trade with the USA is97.  
 
Destination of extra-EU export  
(CPA Group 24.4) in %98 
country 1990 country 2000 
USA 15,9 USA 30,5 
Switzerland 11,4 Switzerland 11,3 
Japan 11,3 Japan 7,2 
Australia 3,6 Australia 3,0 
Saudi Arabia 2,8 Canada 3,0 
Rest 54,9 Rest 44,4 
                                                             
93 Information on the Treaty of Lisbon comes from: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0033_en.htm. 
94 SOMO (2004), 8. 
95 Idem, 15. 
96 Gambini (2010), 1. 
97 Idem, 2. 
98 SOMO (2003), 21; Eurostat, Comext. 
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Origin of extra-EU import  
(CPA Group 24.4) in %99 
country 1990 country 2000 
Switzerland 47,6 USA 43,9 
USA 30,1 Switzerland 32,7 
Japan 8,1 Japan 6,2 
China 3,1 China 3,3 
Norway 2,1 Israel 2,3 
Rest 8,9 Rest 11,7 
 
World pharmaceutical market by region,  
year prior to September 30, 2003.100 
Region Value (£ bn) % of total 
USA 127 46 
Europe 76 27 
Japan 31 11 
Asia Pacific (ex. Japan) 19 7 
Latin America 12 4 
Middle East, Africa 8 3 
Canada 6 2 
Total 279 100 
 
 As the tables above show the USA and Switzerland were already the most 
important trading partners of the EU in 1990. And still are in 2000. For the 
pharmaceutical industry this is important, because, as the other table shows, this is 
where their main market is as well. 86 percent of the pharmaceuticals market is to be 
found in what is called the ‘First World’. Underlining what I previously stated on which 
diseases are targeted by their research. This is where the money is. 240 billion pounds of 
it. 
 Overall the external trade has had its own development. In the period 1995 to 
2005 there has been a significant uninterrupted growth in imports and exports of the EU. 
However the trade balance shows another story. Until 1997 the surplus was growing 
rapidly to 48,6 billion euros. In 2000 it had shivered away to a deficit of 91,4 billion 
euros (both EU-15). It recovered in 2002, but was back in the red by 2005101. In 2000 
and 2005 the main export countries for the EU were the USA and Switzerland. On 
imports in 2000 the largest trading partners were respectively the USA, Japan and China, 
but in 2005 this changed to respectively China, the USA and the Russian Federation102.  
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 In 2000 the EU-25 added 50,579 million euros, Japan 42,133 million and the USA 
69,426 million. To give these figures a bit more perspective: the EU-25 employed 
542,900 persons, Japan 94,681 and the USA 302,483. Which makes for very interesting 
statistics103.  Especially when you consider that the cost of employees was much higher 
in the EU-25 than it was in the USA. Meanwhile the EU-25 has a higher investment rate 
than the USA and one twice as high as in Japan104. In absolute terms the number of jobs 
the pharmaceutical industry offers, the sector is not very important to the EU as a whole. 
However, the pharmaceutical industry relatively offers a lot of jobs to personnel in the 
research and development sector. This again shows clearly that research and 
development is extremely important to the pharmaceutical industry105. Even though in 
2002 the number of people that worked in the pharmaceutical industry was more than 
half a million this represents only half a percent of the people employed in the non-
financial business economy. The level of added value is at the same time quite high 
which makes this a very interesting sector106.  
 This picture is in accordance with the before mentioned report of the 2005 
committee of the House of Commons. The committee calls the British pharmaceutical 
industry “large, profitable and highly competitive” and “The industry has an outstanding 
record in developing new medicines, and is a major source of funding of medical 
research”. They only see a problem in the fact that the industry has become more 
involved with making a profit. But that this is a global problem and the UK is no worse of 
than any other country 107 . They continue by claiming that the “industry’s ability to 
compete internationally requires a legislative and organisational framework for research 
that protects the interests of all stakeholders – patients, researchers and pharmaceutical 
companies”108. 
 Overall, a couple of developments stand out. These are the developments that 
have had the most influence on the pharmaceutical industry. And therefore give us the 
clearest picture towards answering the sub question this part of the thesis is build 
around. In the first place the growing power of the EU and the professionalisation of the 
lobby in Brussels that went along with that. This is of great importance to the 
pharmaceutical industry, because, as I showed, the EU is one of the most important 
markets for them. Issues such as parallel trade, generic medicines and patent protection 
are therefore high on the agenda for the industry. It is worth noticing that, at first sight, 
these issues are all moving in favour of the pharmaceutical companies. And they are 
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moving slow. Outside of Europe this is not always the case. The recent events in India, 
concerning the revocation of a cancer drug patent held by Novartis109, shows that the EU 
situation is not as apparent as it might seem. Closer to home was the failure of the 
Lisbon Strategy not a positive development for the pharmaceutical industry, but the fact 
that they were targeted as one of the main beneficiaries of this strategy was positive. 
The answer to the sub question that stands at the basis of this part of the thesis is 
therefore not a wholehearted ‘yes’. But overall the claim can be made that events have 
moved in favour of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 With this in mind the mood is set for the case study. Getting to the core of the 
thesis. 
                                                             
109 Reuters, 8 April 2013. 
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Part Three; The Case         
 
At this point it comes down to the case itself. We can now look at animal testing. There 
are a few sub questions that need to be answered in this part. First of all, what are the 
interests that the pharmaceutical industry wants to protect? What are the positions of the 
other actors in this case? What is the role of ECHA in this case? 
 
Historical background 
Before going to the actual analysis of the case I will go into the history of animal testing. 
Animal testing in itself is very old. But only since the nineteenth century did people 
began to protest it. The first laws to protect animals stem from that time. In 1822 the 
British parliament passed the first law that was aimed specifically at protecting animals. 
The first anti animal testing law dates from 1876, again in the UK. It is also in the second 
half of this century that the first animal rights groups began to appear. Of course, the 
reason why the discussion around animal testing is so complicated and slow moving is 
because the advances in research that have been made thanks to animal testing. 
Especially in the medical field many useful discoveries can be accredited to animal 
testing. These advantages are the reason why, besides the before mentioned anti animal 
testing groups, there are groups that promote or at least actively defend animal testing. 
Mainly in countries where the discussion around the subject is very polarized, like in the 
UK.  
 Naturally laws in the beginning of the nineteenth century concerned with animal 
welfare were less strict than they are now. It is, however, not a straight line towards a 
more animal friendly environment. Were in the USA a drug could be taken off the market 
after it was proven to be dangerous in 1937 this changed. Drugs needed to be proven 
safe through animal testing before they could enter the market. A complete reverse in 
the approach towards drugs. Cause of this change was the mass poisoning and death of 
more than a hundred people after using the elixir sulfanilamide. In the fifties again things 
got catastrophic. From 1957 to 1961 a medicine against morning sickness and to aid 
sleep, thalidomide, was sold to pregnant women. More than 10,000 children whose 
mothers used the drug were born with deformities. Until that time it was unknown that 
medicines taken by the mother could affect their child. Very quickly laws were passed 
that obligated pharmaceutical companies to test their medicines on pregnant animals 
whenever pregnant women were to use their drug.  
 An important fact in the discussion around the development of legislation for 
animal testing is the introduction of the three Rs. Replacement, Reduction and 
Refinement. Rex Burch and William Russel published these principles in 1959 as a guide 
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on how to approach animal testing110. This became the golden formula for policy change 
and indirectly led to the first World Congress for Alternatives for Animal Testing in 1993. 
Those three Rs were already in 1986 known at the EC. While working on a guideline for 
animal testing the EC made use of these three Rs. Prove of that is the, in 2005 
established, European Partnership to Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing (EPAA). A 
joint initiative of the EC, seven European trade associations and individual companies. 
Among them the EFPIA.  
 In an effort to phase out all animal testing the cosmetics sector is the first to be 
taken on. A ban on testing of finished cosmetics products is in place since 2004 and a 
ban on the testing of product ingredients applies since 2009. It is important to note that 
the first directive concerning the reduction of animal testing in cosmetic products dates 
from 24 July 1979. And in 2013 a full marketing ban will be effective on all cosmetics 
that have products in them that are tested on animals. This is a major step towards an 
EU wide ban on animal testing. The cut off date of 11 March 2013 was already proposed 
in a working paper in 2004 for the import of cosmetics containing ingredients that have 
been tested on animals. Even if this ban only affects one percent of all tests that are 
done on animals in the EU. So far Member States were regulating this on an individual 
basis. The EC is trying hard to establish a policy, but industry lobbying and Member State 
stubbornness have made progress slow. In 2007 REACH111, the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals, regulation and the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA) came into action. ECHA is the agency that is responsible for the execution 
of REACH. This agreement, which took seven years to pass, concerns the improvement of 
the protection of human health and the environment from the risks that can be posed by 
chemicals, wile enhancing the competitiveness of the EU chemicals industry. But more 
important for the subject of this thesis, it also promotes alternative methods for the 
hazard assessment of substances in order to reduce the number of tests on animals. 
Meaning that the regulations in REACH directly affect anyone who is involved in animal 
testing. Future steps towards reduction of animal testing will probably be done through 
this agency. The EC faces a daunting task getting all stakeholders aboard regulations 
such as the cosmetics directive. An example of the challenges the EC faces is that in the 
US mice are not even regarded as test animals112. While eighty percent of test animals 
used are mice. And even though the US is outside of the EU it shows the kind of 
differences that apply to different countries. Within the EU Austria does not allow testing 
on monkeys and apes. Most other countries do allow testing on monkeys, but not on 
apes. What does not make the discussion much easier is that nobody seems to know how 
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many animals are actually tested each year. The numbers vary widely. The EC estimated 
in 2004 that in the next ten years about 2.6 million animals would be tested in the EU. In 
2009 ECHA announced that the number of animals tested in this period would be more 
likely to be around 9 million. More than three times the original estimation. 
 
The pharmaceutical industries interests 
From the previous section the first sub question can be partially answered. Where does 
the pharmaceutical industry stand on animal testing? Considering the history of animal 
testing the industry seems to be scared of two things. Causing dangerous situations for 
the public health and high costs to prevent these situations. This might seem 
problematic, but it does show that the industry sometimes has to look for a balance 
between the two. A good way to find out how the stakeholders feel about a particular 
subject is to look at position papers. But first we have to establish who these 
stakeholders actually are. In this part of the thesis I would have liked to separate the 
stakeholders between the pharmaceutical industry and the others. Unfortunately, this 
division does not work for several reasons. Of the other stakeholders I will speak in a 
minute. First I have to bring into memory that the pharmaceutical industry is historically 
very close to the chemical industry. And because pharmaceutical companies work a lot 
with chemicals it is not uncommon for a chemical industry association to represent 
pharmaceutical companies. This is for example the case at the European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC). Therefore it is possible to place the chemical industry and the 
pharmaceutical industry in the same corner in this case.  
 The main interests that the pharmaceutical industry need to protect concerning 
animal testing are very closely linked with what has been said above. The industry does 
not mind cutting back the number of animal tests. They seem very willing to do so. The 
only problem is that they cannot afford to bring a product on the market that has they 
are not sure about safety wise. Testing a product thoroughly will ensure that, but to do 
so they need animals. Directly testing on human test subjects is just too dangerous. Most 
organisations that defend animal rights will agree upon the principle of this argument. 
The debate then is not about whether or not there should be testing on animals. The 
debate is about how and how fast to minimize these tests. There are a number of sub 
issues involved here. The Good Laboratory Practices (GLP), International Council on 
Harmonization (ICH) guidelines et cetera.  
 The European Association for Chemical Distributors (FECC) is not a big fan of 
REACH or of its GLP, which concerns the use of animals in the testing of chemicals. There 
position is that GLP is to expensive, especially for small and medium enterprises, and 
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should only be applied to newly generated animal data113. However, FECC does not see 
this as a focus point for their efforts. Representing chemical distributors and not chemical 
producers they are hardly touched by legislation concerning animal testing. A passive 
stance and a conservative standpoint are therefore justifiable. Especially, if you take into 
account that many of their associate members are members of CEFIC. And CEFIC on the 
other hand is much more lenient towards banning animal testing. Executive Director for 
Research & Innovation Gernot Klotz formulates their position as follows: “The chemical 
industry has an obligation to foster a genuine open dialog on alternatives for animal 
testing,”114 to which he adds: “The industry is well aware of the ethical challenge, but we 
are forced by stringent European legislation to do the testing.”115 As a result they are 
pushing for the use of realistic legislation that is based on the three Rs through EPAA. 
EFPIA, as a member, stands on the same principles as EPAA. With an EU lobbying budget 
of 570.000 euros not a financial giant, but certainly a stakeholder to take into account. 
And as one of the main representatives of the pharmaceutical industry it is legitimate to 
claim that the pharmaceutical industries position on animal testing coincides with EPAA. 
Meaning that the 3Rs should be the guiding principles in getting rid of animal 
experimentation over time.  
 
Other stakeholders 
Still, the position of the pharmaceutical industry can be described as ambiguous. They 
are willing to end animal testing, but they claim they are not able. Their opponents are 
much clearer about their aims. This helps a lot in answering the second sub question; 
What are the positions of the other actors in this case?  
 A very specific group in the list of other stakeholders that concern themselves with 
animal testing are the NGOs that aim to abolish the practice. On the ECHA stakeholder 
list there are three that take it a bit farther than the rest. ECEAE, Eurogroup for Animals, 
and HSI.  
 The European Coalition to End Animal Experiments (ECEAE) represents national 
animal welfare organisations and its sole existence is the ending of animal 
experimentation. It is the principle on which they are founded. One of the founding 
members, Geoffrey Deckers, has been jailed for very questionable actions involving 
threats to employees of the Biomedical Primate Research Centre in Rijswijk and the 
kidnapping of an administrator of an auction house for fur producers in Nederasselt116. 
They are not very well funded if you look at their budget for European lobby activities. 
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Which is under 50.000 euros. As a member of the International Council on Animal 
Protection in Pharmaceutical Programmes (ICAPP), and of the International Council on 
Animal Protection (ICAPO), which has expert observer status at the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and accredited at ECHA and the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), they have access to the right people. Perhaps in 
order to keep being salonfähig they utter their opinions in a mild mannered way and 
promote, through ICAPP, the ICH, (ICH was established in 1990 to get the EU, Japan, 
and the USA on the same regulations; which lead to ICAPP) and VICH (the V stands for 
veterinary) guidelines through their Human Cosmetics Standard Leaping Bunny. Another 
sign that ECEAE is taken seriously is the meeting117 they had with CEFIC on 7 September 
2010 to discuss their positions on REACH. But to answer the question on what they 
actually want more is needed. ECEAE states that they are “opposed to all experiments on 
live animals as a matter of principle, and campaigns for an end to their use for this 
purpose”118. A little further in the same document they show what I consider to be their 
policy core beliefs when they say: “While animal experiments continue, the ECEAE 
campaigns for the maximum protection of animals in laboratories, to ensure that these 
animals receive the legal protection they are supposed to under EU and Member State 
legislation and supports initiatives to develop new methods to reduce their suffering, 
reduce their numbers and ultimately replace their use”119. Here an acceptance of the 
reality forces them to compromise.  
 The Eurogroup for Animals is a federation of NGOs and has a lot more 
manoeuvrability in its budget of 1.4 million euros. The main focus of their effort lies in 
promoting animal welfare. Not banning animal experimentation specifically, or even at 
all. Experimentation is detrimental to animal welfare and should therefore be banned, but 
is recognized as a necessary evil. In 2010 they pushed in a policy paper120 for faster 
approval of alternative methods and a more consolidated approach. They state this in 
their mission statement as well. The Eurogroup for Animals strives for an Europe “that 
cares for animals”121 and where cruelty to animals is not tolerated, animal welfare is 
protected by legislation and every animal can live in an environment where they can 
perform their natural behaviour. This gives us the same position as ECEAE in that their 
position comes down to no more testing on animals, but to accept a certain level of 
testing as long as alternatives are preferred and move towards overtaking all forms of 
animal testing.  
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 The Humane Society International (HSI) has the same priority as the previous two 
organisations. Promoting alternatives for animal experimentation. Backed by an EU 
lobbying budget of one million euros and 11 million supporters worldwide they are not 
easy to ignore. HSI believes the same as the two before mentioned organisations. 
“Working to save more than 12 million animals from suffering and death in laboratories 
across the EU”122. Predictably they focus on reducing and replacing animal testing. 
 
 A bit more to the middle of the spectrum there are a lot of NGOs that are against 
animal testing in principle, but who do not seek it with the same fervour as the above 
mentioned organisations. In this category you will find organisations like ClientEarth, 
Greenpeace, WWF, Friends of the Earth, EEB, et cetera. One thing these organisations 
share is their focus on the environment. A much broader subject than animal welfare 
alone. Usually, these organisations also have a much larger budget (the four mentioned 
all have budgets that exceed two million euros) and a much larger range of topics they 
concern themselves with.  
 In March 2005 the EEB, EPHA, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WWF and WECF 
published a paper123 with five points to improve the REACH agreement on. One of the 
points includes the reinstatement of three non-animal tests. Showing their collective 
commitment towards these kinds of tests. In April 2011 a proposition paper124 by CHEM 
Trust states there should be a pragmatic approach towards minimizing the amount of 
animal testing and that there is an urgent need to find robust non-animal methods. 
Among the supporters of ChemTrust are the EEB, Friends of the Earth and WECF. 
Apparently still working together on this subject. And neither in this paper does it say 
that animal testing should stop all together. Making their effort much less urgent and 
more flexible than that of the ECEAE, HSI and Eurogroup for Animals. A reason for this is 
that the mission statements of BEUC, ChemSec, ClientEarth, EEB, Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace, HEAL, WECF and WWF do mention the environment, but not animals in 
particular. Like I just claimed; Their focus lies in caring for the environment as a whole.  
 Even though, each stakeholder has their own specific issues and priorities 
sometimes patterns emerge. EEB, HEAL, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WECF, WWF, 
Client Earth, BEUC, ChemSec and others have, as I have shown, published position 
papers concerning, among other things, animal testing. Not all of them have endorsed 
the same position papers, but combining the different papers and gives us this group of 
like-minded stakeholders. Their positions tell us they would like to see animal testing 
disappear, but understand that they might be necessary for the good of mankind. 
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However, alternatives should be promoted and researched. Reduction is the key. For 
example through sharing of test results. The difference between this group and the first 
three NGOs I introduced can probably best be described with the words ‘urgency and 
focus’. What these organisations have in common, and what separates them from the 
other NGOs, is that they represent the interests of animals and not the environment. And 
where the first group uses well balanced sentences like: “Given significant recent strides 
in biomedical science, there is enormous potential for developing alternative non-animal 
test methods. Examples of WWF's commitment to promoting alternatives to animal 
testing and to reducing the use of test animals include ...”125, they are more likely to use 
statements like: "Imagine a syringe being forced down your throat and a massive 
chemical dose pumped into your stomach, or being squeezed into restraints and forced to 
breathe toxic vapours for hours. From drugs to pesticides and household cleaners, 
chemicals and products of all descriptions are still being tested in massive doses on dogs, 
mice, rabbits and other animals"126. 
 
 Then there is the International Federation for Animal Health (IFAH). Representing 
the European animal health industry. Their position is a bit two sided. On the one hand 
they would like to be able to produce products that are safe and cheap, but on the other 
hand their core business is animal health. Experimenting on animals is therefore a bit 
counterintuitive. As a solution they came up with the 1-1-1 concept. All products should 
have one dossier, with one scientific assessment, and one European marketing 
authorisation valid in all member states. This sounds similar to what FECC supported in 
march 2006127. One Substance One Registration (OSOR), is based on the same principle 
that tries to get the bureaucracy to a minimum, reduce costs, and centralise the 
exchange of information. Reserving a large role for ECHA. FECC also wishes to protect 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As they see it, the GLP is a good idea for 
new data, but is far too expensive for implementation by SMEs. For the same reason 
should SMEs be free from scrutiny concerning CSR if they are younger than ten years of 
age.  
 With that in mind it is no wonder that both organisations are members of EPAA. 
EPAA is a joint initiative of the EC and private parties with the goal of pursuing the 3Rs in 
regulatory testing. Started in November 2005 they can be considered a powerful group. 
The members of EPAA can be divided into three categories; the EC (through the DGs 
Enterprise and Industry, Research and Innovation, Health and Consumer Protection, 
Environment, and Joint Research Centre), European trade associations from seven 
                                                             
125 WWF (2003). 
126 http://www.hsi.org/issues/chemical_product_testing/. 
127 FECC (2006). 
 40
industry sectors (IFAH-Europe on animal health, CEFIC on chemicals, Cosmetics Europe 
on cosmetics, ECPA on crop protection, IFRA on fragrances and flavours, AISE on soaps 
and detergents, and EFPIA on pharmaceuticals), and 35 individual companies. This 
collaboration tries to accelerate the implementation of their policy views and create a 
broad support at the same time. By pulling together their knowledge and produce 
common standpoints they aim to take the momentum into their direction.  
 In 2006 EPAA published their first progress report, describing among other things 
their goals. It claims EPAAs “objective is to accelerate the development, validation and 
acceptance of alternative approaches for the purpose of regulatory safety 
assessment.” 128  Interestingly the ending of animal testing is not mentioned. Even 
though, replacement, refinement and reduction will benefit animal welfare it does 
specifically not mean that testing on animals will be abandoned altogether. 
 On another level EPAA is important as it deals with a perhaps illogical problem. By 
including all DGs that are involved in the policy making that surrounds animal testing the 
communication between them runs more smoothly. Therefore making it harder to play 
these DGs against each other. Situations like what happened around the Pharma Package 
can be avoided this way.  
 
ECHA 
So far there is one actor that deserves more attention than it has gotten. The European 
Chemicals Agency has a key position in this case. ECHA was established to manage and 
carry out the technical, scientific, and administrative aspects of REACH. But more 
importantly, they make sure there is a sound coherence within the legislation of the EU. 
These tasks are delegated to ECHA by the EC. Both REACH and ECHA came into action on 
1 June 2007. They concern the treatment of chemicals. Animal testing therefore falls 
within the reach of this agreement. Reducing the number of tests on animals is one of its 
pillars. One of its goals is to avoid the use of animals as much as possible and where it 
cannot be avoid should the animals be treated as humanly as possible. REACH is 
promoting GLP. All in close cooperation with OECD. In-vitro tests that might replace an 
in-vivo tests will be judged by the European Centre for Validation of Alternative Methods 
(ECVAM). The 3Rs are central to what REACH, and therefore ECHA, is trying to do with 
animal testing.  
 Since its creation ECHA functions as the central institution around which this 
discussion presents itself. Recognising this themselves they have drawn up a list of their 
stakeholders129. More than sixty in total. The list, however, does not contain all the 
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stakeholders involved in what ECHA does. This has to do with the way the list has been 
put together. Organisations could apply to be recognized as stakeholder by ECHA. If they 
met with the criteria ECHA has set130 the organisation would be recognized as such. 
Institutions and Member States that are a part of the institutional framework that are 
part of the policy process around this subject are not all included. ECHA is an agency of 
the EU and independent from the EC. But there is a heavy influence of the EC imbedded 
into ECHA. The EC is responsible for the implementation of REACH and Member States 
can hold the EC accountable. However, the EC has delegated this responsibility to ECHA. 
Stakeholdership of the EC and Member States is thereby guaranteed. This is why they do 
not appear on the list. Simply because they are already involved in the decision making 
process where they need to be. 
 
 In fact, one of the reasons why ECHA wants to get her stakeholders involved, 
apart from channelling information into the concerned fields, is to get input from different 
parties and make her policy acceptable to all who are touched by it. The reason why 
lobbying efforts focus on ECHA and not on the EC is because of the before mentioned 
delegated powers that ECHA holds. Which means ECHA decides whether a testing 
method is allowed or not. They even contribute to the development of alternative 
methods to animal testing and the promotion of these methods.  
 What it all comes down to is the REACH agreement. This is the piece of legislation 
that it is all about. I have been mentioning it on several occasions. All chemical 
substances are subject to this agreement. It focuses on the production and use of the 
chemicals and their possible impact on the environment and human health. Animal 
testing is therefore a part of REACH. Within REACH the aim is to avoid animal testing, but 
understand that they are necessary to understand the hazards of chemicals better. One 
of the measures it contains is that new tests are allowed to be carried out only once. 
After that companies that would like to use the results are able to buy these at the 
organisation that carried out the test. This organisation is obligated to sell to everyone 
who wants to buy and at a ‘reasonable’  price. Another regulation is that the lowest class 
of animals should be used in testing. Vertebrates are a last resort.  
 
 Two things are central to the entire discussion; public health and safety, and 
animal welfare. Since the sulfanilamide and thalidomide disasters in the previous century 
the value of animal testing has been irrevocably established. What is also clear is that 
everyone agrees that looking for alternatives to animal tests is the way forward. The 3Rs 
are irrefutable. Both the pharmaceutical and chemical industries and the animal welfare 
organisations are in agreement on this. The difference is in the urgency. Where the 
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industrial stakeholders are very hesitant in replacing animal tests for non-animal tests 
and sharing their results, the animal welfare organisations are much more progressive. 
ECHA as central organ has to find a route with which all parties can live. Their delegated 
powers allow them to operate quite independently within their mandate. In the next part 
I will go into the different resources that the stakeholders have at their disposal.  
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Part Four; A Different Approach       
 
This last part of the thesis can be seen as an extra analysis of the previous part. Though, 
this time the analysis is themed. The Advocacy Coalition Framework, which I will explain 
in a little bit, defines coalitions and looks at the resources these coalitions have at their 
disposal. These resources will act as the themes here. The sub question is therefore 
constructed around these resources (financial resources, access to decision makers, 
public opinion, information, mobilizing troops, and skilful leadership). How can you 
describe the position of the pharmaceutical industry when you look at the resources used 
in the ACF?  
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The ACF was developed by Paul Sabatier131. Designed to show how the development of 
policy is shaped. Nadia Carboni uses it in 2009 to solve a number of research questions; 
“how does decision and policy making on health issue take place? Who are the key actors 
in the process? What is the role of interest groups in health care-related policies? How do 
national governments and EU institutions interact in the health policy making process 
and governance?”132. And just as this thesis does, she uses case studies. Her main 
assumption is that the balance between public health and health care on the one hand 
and industry policy on the other is one of the crucial elements in health policy making in 
the EU. If what she says about the two cases that she has chosen is right, it might be 
right for the entire subject. 
 Carboni uses the ACF because it enables her to take a look into how the policy 
process works, without being distracted by the detailed handlings of the different actor. 
Describing how different stakeholders behave in order to influence this process and 
explain the policy outcomes in conflicting political contexts. “The ACF views the policy 
process as a competition between coalitions of actors who advocate beliefs about policy 
problems and solutions. This competition takes place in the policy sub systems, defined 
as the set of actors who are actively concerned with an issue and regularly seek to 
influence public policy related to it”133. In other words, the ACF is based upon the theory 
that stakeholders can be categorised into coalitions and that these are held together by a 
certain set of beliefs. Actors might change coalitions whenever this suits them and it is 
possible that coalitions can disappear or new ones are formed.  
 The first step in building up this theory is to collect stakeholders. One of the ways 
to do that is to use a snowballing-sampling technique. Get a couple of stakeholders and 
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see who they deal with on the subject. Then look to those actors and see if they are 
stakeholders. If they are see who they deal with and so on. After a while a network will 
be visible with all major stakeholders. Smaller or less important stakeholders might be 
missing from a list that has been created in this way, but these stakeholders can be 
defined as unimportant for the decision making process.  
 After having collected all stakeholders it is possible to categorise them into 
coalitions and define the different beliefs that hold those coalitions together. All coalitions 
have three kinds of beliefs. Deep core, policy core, and secondary aspects. Deep core 
beliefs are the most fundamental and will not change. Under no circumstances. They 
define how the members of a coalition will interpret the world. Policy core beliefs are a 
little less stringent. In broad lines these set out perceptions and policy positions which 
are necessary to achieve their deep core beliefs in the long run. Changing these is not an 
easy task, but it is not impossible. The ACF argues that coalitions form around policy core 
beliefs. That doesn’t necessarily mean that their deep core beliefs are the same. Actors 
with similar policy core beliefs are inclined to cooperate with each other to influence the 
policy making process in their favour. Sometimes that means changing the policy core 
beliefs of another coalition. Two ways, described in the ACF, to do so are policy change 
and policy learning. Policy change is a transformation of the belief system in the policy 
subsystem. In other words; the world (in which the coalition operates) has changed 
significantly and has shocked the beliefs system. Policy learning is a much less intrusive 
means of change. Over time coalitions will adept to changing circumstances and will learn 
form past experiences. Usually this leaves the policy core in tact and only changes the 
secondary aspects. The secondary aspects can be described as the empirical beliefs on 
how to implement the policy core beliefs. Which means that the secondary aspects are 
the easiest to translate into actual legislation and compromise on.  
 No matter how deep beliefs run, achieving policy learning, influencing 
stakeholders, and pursuing policy objectives can only be done effectively if coalitions 
have enough resources at their disposal. The amount of resources different coalitions 
have at their disposal is very unequal. Industrial coalitions used to be much better 
financed and staffed than NGOs. Who, in turn, often can count on more public support.  
 The ACF divides the resources a coalition has at its disposal into six categories. 
Financial resources, access to decision makers, public opinion, information, mobilizing 
troops, and skilful leadership. Each of these resources can tilt the balance in favour of 
one coalition. The more of these resources a coalition can use, the better its chances of 
success. A properly balanced combination makes them even stronger.  
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Public opinion 
In this thesis public opinion takes in a special place. It is therefore only logical to start 
with this resource. In the first part of this thesis I have already spoken about several 
aspects of this resource. What I will focus on here is where this resource has otherwise 
been used.  
 A case were public opinion has been quite influential in setting change in motion is 
CSR. Until thirty years ago only a select few people new what CSR was. Before then the 
general public was not involved in the discussions around the subject. Even though 
influential people like Andrew Carnegie and W.K. Kellogg were already engaged in 
formulating and spreading the ideas that make up CSR134. That, however, has changed 
dramatically since the 90s. And though CSR is not the bottom line for many 
organisations, it has moved up the priority list. Cases such as animal testing make clear 
that the pharmaceutical industry is very conscious about its CSR. What started as a 
marketing strategy (a secondary aspect known as ‘green washing’135) to counter bad 
press has in some ways become a method of operating that businesses and institutions 
would want to follow if possible. Not withstanding the progress that has been made in 
this field, there are many examples were companies present themselves as compliant 
with CSR, but have in fact changed very little. Because of that some sceptics say that 
CSR has failed. Jill Murray136 and James K. Rowe137 claim that the debate has become 
stylized and that the main reason for corporations to engage in CSR is to keep 
governments from regulating certain subjects and to give them an opportunity to show 
off their CSR initiatives. It seems then that the public opinion can be countered as an 
instrument for lobby purposes.  
 One of the fiercest battles for the favour of the public has been fought in the UK. 
Opponents of animal testing were influencing the public opinion to a point where the 
proponents found it necessary to get involved too. Leading to the creation of an 
organisation called Pro-Test, which had as its main goal to campaign in favour of 
continued animal testing. After being active for five years the organisation was shut 
down in February 2011, because it had met its goals.  
 As an example of how public opinion has been used to influence the policy making 
process around animal testing the cosmetics directive 138  is a good example. Under 
pressure of the animal rights groups, who had been campaigning throughout the eighties 
and nineties, the EC first adopted the Cosmetics directive in 1993. Aiming to ban the 
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testing of finished cosmetic products and its ingredients on animals and the marketing 
and sales of such products in the EU on 1 January 1998. The entering into force of this 
directive has consequently been delayed several times (1998, 2000 and 2002), but has 
finally been completed on 11 March 2013. Every time a key date in this process 
approaches the media exposure on this subject peaks. As a result the policy makers feel 
pressured not to abolish the plan, even though the cosmetics industry would like to see 
this. Trying to convince people that safety is more important than animal welfare. A point 
which is much harder to explain to the public. Especially for cosmetics. This leaves them 
with delay as a best scenario.  
 A Good example of a case where publicity did not change the outcome is direct-to-
consumer-communication. The Pharma Package, which involved legislation on direct-to-
consumer-communication, was developed by the DG Enterprise. For its opponents this 
meant a disadvantage. They were embedded into the DG Sanco, whereas the proponents 
were embedded in the DG Enterprise. The call for moving the Package to the DG Sanco, 
in the letter to Barosso139, was motivated from this background. It fuelled the debate 
about comitology again. AIM and ESIP complained about the lack of transparency during 
the process. If this criticism would just have come from BEUC and HAI, who were openly 
sympathetic to AIM and ESIP, it would not have had the same impact. These two 
organisations were no members of the Pharma Forum, but AIM and ESIP were. As 
insiders they should not have had any trouble with transparency. Or were these the 
crocodile tears of stakeholders who did not get their way? 
 Whatever the case, the public opinion did not change much. Newspapers, for 
example, did not change their tone about the subject. In 1999 Suzanne Baart 140  is 
basically reporting the same news, with the same urgency, as her college Joop Bouma in 
2010141. We have to be aware that the rules are changing and that the industry tries to 
advertise prescription drugs. But they make no reference to any form of public outcry 
one way or the other. 
 
Financial resources 
Probably the most well known resource is finances. Partly, because it is by far the easiest 
to measure. It is not only the most familiar, but also the most overestimated. Money is 
necessary up to some point, but ever since bribery has become unattractive as a way of 
influencing policy makers other resources have gained importance. It still costs money 
and there is a minimum you need to be effective, but money is no longer a key factor. 
Many firms that conduct lobby on behalf of their clients are very small and therefore not 
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very money consuming. Although there are companies that throw fists full on it. These 
small firms usually consist of no more than twelve persons and have an annual budget of 
less than a quarter of a million euros. Numbers such as these are no representation of 
the importance of an organisation. They do tell something about the priorities of an 
organisation. Microsoft, with a turnover of more than sixty billion dollars in 2010, spends 
more than four and a half million euros on lobbying in Brussels. In comparison, Philip 
Morris had a comparable turnover, but spend only one and a quarter million euros on 
lobbying in Brussels. The difference between the two budgets can partially be explained 
by Microsofts recent conflicts with the EC142.  
 If you look at animal testing the financial resource paints an interesting picture. 
The amounts that will be mentioned here are the budgets the stakeholders have to spend 
on their EU affairs143. That of course means that not all that money will go to the cause 
of animal testing. Unless that is your raison d’etre, as it is for the ECEAE. It also means 
that the money can be shifted around if necessary. If need be the allocation can be 
changed without increasing the budget. More money therefore does make a difference 
even if it has to be spread over multiple issues. Unfortunately for the ECEAE, they and 
their ideological allies have the least of all stakeholders to spend. Together just under 2.5 
million euros. To which the ECEAE contributes no more than 50.000. Compared to other 
stakeholders the gap is quite considerable. Take for example a group of much more 
moderate stakeholders that work together a lot on these issues; WWF, Greenpeace, 
ClientEarth and Friends of the Earth. Each of these organisations has an allocated budget 
between 2 and 4.7 million euros. Another group of stakeholders that is worth mentioning 
are the members of EPAA. CEFIC alone has 6 million available. Forty-three companies are 
a member of EPAA on their own account. These are companies the size of Bayer, Johnson 
& Johnson, Pfizer and Unilever. No small fish. Together, these four companies have four 
million euros to their name. Besides, there are five DGs144 of the EC member, but they of 
course have no budget to lobby themselves or their colleagues.  
 Taking into account that the radical views have the least to spend it is a safe bet 
that they have to rely on other methods than financial means. But I must repeat that the 
millions the WWF spends on lobby will not all go towards animal testing related issues. 
The same goes for most other stakeholders. This picture is therefore very incomplete and 
cannot solely be relied upon.  
 
                                                             
142 An article relating to the arduous relationship Microsoft and the EC have. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/eu-microsoft-idUSL5E8LO5LN20121024. 
143 All stakeholders registered in the Transparency Register have entered their budgets into the register. The 
mentioned financial resources are based on these figures.  
144 These are the DG Enterprise & Industry, DG Research & Innovation, Health & Consumer Protection, DG 
Environment and DG Joint Research Centre.  
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Access to decision makers 
Far more important is access to decision makers. Without it you will have a hard time 
getting your beliefs turned into policy. Informal relationships are still a very important 
way of establishing and maintaining access. Even though the EC tries to include a large 
part of the stakeholders in the decision making process. According to Guéguen145 NGOs 
get a preferential treatment where it concerns access to the EC. Grown over the years 
this is much less evident in their dealings with the EP or the Council. Although Carboni 
found two policy officers who certainly do not support what Guéguen claims. A policy 
officer from DG Enterprise says: “I think that NGOs are not able to make compromises, 
they are used to shout and make noise, that’s it. I strongly believe that radical positions 
cannot change policy. We do not take into account aggressive attitudes”146. Her other 
policy officer, this time from DG Sanco, is less negative. He or she just says: “we are not 
interested in those groups who behave as ‘ayatollah’. We need scientific arguments, not 
dogmatic ones... NGOs sometimes do ‘religious battles’. They do not want to talk to 
industries as principle”147. Remarkable quotes, since these were expected in the late 
eighties and nineties, but not in 2009. NGOs are supposed to be more professional in 
their approach nowadays.  
 Perhaps unexpectedly, the EC has issues with access as well. The EC is not one 
coherent institution. Not even if you look at specific policy areas. Mainly, because a lot of 
policy subjects concern multiple DGs. This has resulted in an atmosphere of unavoidable, 
mostly friendly, rivalry among them and causes friction from time to time. Not least 
because each DG has its own domain and methods. As I mentioned before, 
communication between them turns out to be in practice not as logical as it seems on 
paper148.  
 Because access is extremely hard to measure it is typically one of those resources 
that is impossible to contain in numbers. For animal testing the group of stakeholders 
that is recognized by ECHA as such all have at least a certain level of access to the policy 
makers and a certain level of involvement in the policy making process. A way to try and 
quantify access is to see how many people a stakeholder has working for them. FECC, for 
example, has 0,1 people working for them. It is easy to imagine that a person who 
spends ten percent of his or her time on a subject will not be able to utilize their 
resources to its fullest in relation to access. Even if you take in account that an interest 
representative with multiple dossiers clearly has advantages over one with just one. On 
the other end of the scale are organisations with many interest representatives working 
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for them. CEFIC has 72. Among the ECHA accredited stakeholders they are by far the 
largest. Followed by ClientEarth with 48. With an average of just under nine interest 
representatives per ECHA stakeholder.  
 Again EPAA has an exceptional position. Within this group ties with policy makers 
are formalized. Not only are members of EPAA accredited stakeholders of ECHA, but the 
before mentioned DGs are incorporated. The lines of communication between 
stakeholders and policy makers are very short and secure for some through this 
arrangement. Giving them a definite competitive edge.  
 
Information 
Information, as said before, is becoming more and more important. Since the late 80s 
interest representatives need to be better informed and able to give the policy makers 
arguments that can be checked. The stronger the argument and the information behind 
the argument, the bigger the chance that policy will change in your favour. However, 
more is needed. The problem is that coalitions are never ironclad. Which can lead to half 
hearted attempts instead of a successful campaign. Having the previous resources in 
order is not a guarantee. Giving a member of parliament the research outcomes that will 
back up his or her arguments in favour of your suggestions can be very helpful in 
steering the policy process. Having better and more information makes convincing policy 
makers much easier. Pressure groups have some trouble with this. Their information is 
expected to be coloured. Having their own research institutions is therefore not always 
the best way to go. These institutions are very expensive as well and a solution has been 
found in sponsoring research of independent institutions, like universities. Some 
industries have a long history in this field and spend a lot of money on this. Governments 
themselves do a lot of research too and they have the tools to stimulate research in 
certain areas (for example by subsidisation).  
 In the whole discussion about whether or not animal testing is necessary scientific 
research plays a very important part. Where the radical NGOs call upon the emotional 
reaction of the public, the industry makes more use of research institutions to put more 
weight behind their arguments. CONCAWE and ECETOC are research institutions that can 
be considered on the side of the oil, chemical and cosmetic industry. Do not bite the 
hand that feeds you applies to all levels of society. The same could be said about ESTIV 
and EUROTOX. The main difference is that they have as their goals the spread of 
information on toxicology and alternatives to animal testing. This might be considered 
pro industry, but they actually promote research into alternatives to animal testing. 
EuCheMS is already more neutral in their judgement, because they use scientists from 
academies and governments together with scientists from the industry. EAERE on the 
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other hand is more prone to the NGOs as can be seen by their members. None of those 
represents the industry.  
 Besides these research institutions other stakeholders will do their own research 
or sponsor universities to do certain research for them. In the pharmaceutical industry 
the sponsoring of scientific research to manipulate the result is not unheard of. Stories of 
researchers that get paid to publish an article under their name while it was ghost written 
by a pharmaceutical company149 or other questionable practices of that magnitude still 
find their way into the newspapers. Meaning that neutral research on pharmaceutical 
subjects should always be read with some form of reserve.  
 In an attempt to deal with this ECHA tries to get as much information from 
different parties as it can and aims to spread that information back into the field. This is 
one of the aims behind the list of stakeholders. To say that one of the coalitions has their 
research on a higher level than the others is too much. 
 
Mobilizing the troops 
A very important resource is the ability to mobilize the troops. Having the support of your 
followers. These can complement the coalitions efforts with the resources from their own 
channels. Large firms, for example, are usually not only a member of their branch 
interest representational organisation, but have their own organisation on the side. 
Combining the efforts of both can be very successful, but the danger is that the efforts of 
all these different organisations are hard to coordinate. At times they are willingly 
interfering with their own coalition 150 . Debilitating the capability of their branch 
organisations to mobilize its troops. Having loads of members does not have to mean 
anything. In the end a lot comes down to how capable a coalition is in mobilizing its 
troops. Can a coalition that wants to act get its members behind it. Members that have 
only subscribed to your newsletter are nice, but members that will use their resources to 
complement yours in the reaching of a common goal are better. This used to be less of a 
problem. Coalitions were quite small and able to efficiently come to a common position. 
Due to a growing number of members these coalitions clogged up. In a reaction today 
coalitions are much more fluid and based on ad-hoc agreements. NGOs have much less 
problems in this field. Being opportunistic and pro-active by nature helps them here to. 
As does their relation with the general public. Forming their opinions on a certain topic 
and getting them to be involved are not that different in approach. An approach that 
NGOs possess.  
 Other rules apply to the EC. For the most part it is organised very hierarchical. 
However, at the top of the hierarchical pyramid it has to deal with the Member States of 
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the EU. Getting those behind a certain topic can be influenced a lot by current, national 
political affairs. Most of which the EC has little grasp upon. Being able to deal with this is 
the responsibility of the president of the EC. His leadership can make a big difference. As 
did the leadership of Delors when the SEA was introduced. On leadership I will speak in a 
minute.  
 NGOs, especially the more fanatical ones, have a history of being able to get their 
followers to take to the streets. This has to do with the way they are organised. Most 
funding comes from private sources and organisations that are visible are more likely to 
get funding than those that fly under the radar. Often, the more moderate and larger an 
NGO has become the further it is institutionalised. This is a good way, together with 
formalizing relationships, to secure collaboration. Committing to a common goal through 
initiatives like EPAA can therefore be seen as a powerful resource. Benefiting their 
capacity to mobilize their troops. Under the condition that they have their leadership in 
order.   
 
Skilful leadership 
Skilful leadership helps a lot in this type of situation. Having someone who is able to 
focus the organisations efforts, is creative enough to bypass pitfalls that his predecessors 
could not and convince others to join your cause often proves to be invaluable. Of 
course, having all these resources is ideal, but no one does. There is always someone 
better equipped with something. In an ideal situation the playing field in which the 
interest representatives operate is transparent, accessible to all actors, has a multitude 
of actors and offers equal opportunities to all actors.  
 The President of the EC has gotten a longer term to accomplish his goals with the 
Maastricht Treaty. Still, five years is not that long. Re-election is possible, but the 
Member States decide who gets the position. The leaders of industrial organisations, for 
example, stay much longer. NGOs do not elect their leaders and they have the advantage 
that those leaders can direct all their time towards interest representation. Plus, these 
leaders can boost their efforts with their powers as a manager. Industrial organisations 
will usually appoint a secretary-general to lead the interest representation. This 
secretary-general will have to keep all actors he represents happy and has limited 
powers151. On important issues the boards of directors of the different companies can get 
involved on their own accounts. The industry is therefore not as powerless as the position 
of the secretary-general might seem. Guéguen discovered another problem; the 
“Secretary General Syndrome”152. Organisations usually start off with a enigmatic and 
pro-active secretary-general. Over the years this will create tensions within the 
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organisation. When it is time to replace the first secretary-general, chances are that most 
members will opt for a less demanding or weaker secretary-general. After which the need 
for a stronger figure arises. And so on.  
 If this “Secretary General Syndrome” would be applied to the EC it paints an 
interesting picture. Jacques Delors was no doubt a pro-active President. Accomplishing 
the SEA and Maastricht Treaty and laying the foundations for the introduction of the euro 
his achievements are many. Jacques Santer did get to oversee the preparations towards 
the introduction of the euro, but is mostly known for the fraud scandal that forced him 
and his Commission to resign. Skipping Manuel Marin, who was interim-President for less 
than a year, Romano Prodi is next on the list. He was able to get more power with the 
Treaty of Nice to reign over his Commission. Powers which had already increased with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. After him came José Manuel Barroso. Until now his 
Commission is the first to shrink in size, he had to deal with a lot of euroscepticism and 
in the Lisbon Treaty the controlling powers of the EP over the EC have increased. Making 
him the weaker President after the strong Prodi. Looking at the EC Presidency Guéguens 
theory seems to hold.  
 A collaboration such as EPAA is a very indirect way to lead efforts. The steering 
committee of EPAA has to listen to the feedback they get from their different 
organisations, who in the case of the industry branch representatives among them have 
to listen to the feedback they get from their members. NGOs like WWF, Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth and others have tackled this problem by operating in ad hoc 
coalitions. Publishing proposition papers together with other likeminded organisations. 
Which means that these coalitions have some usual suspects, but if one does not agree 
with the position they just do not sign.  
 A case were leadership proved a key resource was the Pharma Review and the 
following Pharma Package. The one constant in this case is that the initiative lies with the 
DG Enterprise for most of the time. The Pharma Review and the Pharma Package were 
both of their hand, the Pharma Forum and G10 Medicines Group were their initiative, and 
so were the Bangemann Rounds. Protesting parties such as BEUC, HAI, EPHA, AIM, and 
ESIP were effectively sidelined. It seems that this leadership, backed by industrial 
approval, proved decisive.  
 
 So what does that all mean for the position of the pharmaceutical industry? Most 
certainly the picture is a bit different from the one that was presented in the previous 
part. The public opinion has been used on multiple occasions. Examples like Pro-Test 
show that where opponents of animal testing get the public opinion too much on their 
side the pharmaceutical industry is capable of neutralising this resource. Financially there 
are definitely big differences. From half a grant up to six million. Unfortunately, these 
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figures are very inconclusive. The figures have all been entered by the organisations 
themselves into the Transparency Register voluntarily and unchecked. And they 
represent the budget that an organisation has for EU lobbying. Nowhere is specified how 
much of that budget is allocated towards animal testing. The financial resource therefore 
needs more investigating before it can be of any real use. Access gives us a clearer story. 
The members of EPAA are nearest to the DGs and share the 3Rs principle. Even though 
NGOs sometimes have preferential treatment, its seems that they would have to exploit 
this in order to compensate for the advantage EPAA members have. Information is an 
important resource in this case. Alternative methods to animal tests have to be invented, 
improved and assessed. This is one of the pillars of the 3Rs principle. Getting these 
alternatives. It is no surprise that quite a few organisations are involved into research 
and the spread of information on the subject. As a matter of fact, it is part of the core 
business of ECHA. The one place where the NGOs have an easier job is in mobilizing their 
troops. Being smaller and committed to a narrower field of interest does have its 
advantages. On leadership they have an advantage as well. For the same reasons. This 
means that glancing at the resources of the ACF gives no one side the absolute 
advantage. Although the combination of more money, the formalised access through 
EPAA and the spread of information give the impression that the pharmaceutical industry 
has a slightly better position.  
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Conclusion           
 
Within the parameters, that have been set at the start of this thesis, the sub questions 
have provided a good picture of the case. Given that animal testing is a controversial 
topic and one in which certain stakeholders actively try to involve the public. I have 
ventured outside of the case. As I announced. The case study on animal testing is the 
primary focus of this thesis, but on several occasions I took a glimpse at other cases. 
Mainly to keep the thesis from becoming too narrow in its focus.  
 
 The first part of this thesis was committed to deepen these boundaries and had 
three sub questions at the heart of it. Each of these questions was derived from the 
parameters that had been set in the introduction. The first and second sub question; who 
are involved in the protection of the pharmaceutical industries interests at the EC? and; 
how does the EU policy making process work and what is the role of the EC in it?, 
address the stakeholders. Who are involved.  
 On the side of the pharmaceutical companies, and representatives thereof, we find 
the chemical industry. Both industries are closely linked since their creation. At the side 
of the EC there are numerous institutions and Member States involved. Though most are 
not very active. What is noteworthy, is that the policy making process of the EU is aimed 
at gathering information from stakeholders. Giving them an opportunity to defend their 
interests and contribute to new legislation. Not just the industry stakeholders, but NGO 
stakeholders as well. And by promoting and facilitating transparency the EU facilitates 
access to information for all stakeholders.  
 
 In the second part of the thesis formed a purely historical narrative of the 
European Union and the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. With at the root the question 
whether or not events have moved in favour of the pharmaceutical industry. Since its 
creation the EU has moved constantly towards more responsibilities and the consolidation 
of powers. While the EU was on the road from evolving from the ECSC towards its 
current form, the pharmaceutical industry’s interests grew closer. At first through 
informal relations, like the ERT. Policy makers and politicians could, and did, use these 
contacts to determine the course the European integration would take. As this 
development took shape and became more powerful the pharmaceutical industry began 
to formalize and professionalize its relationship with the policy makers.  
 The twentieth century marks a period of consolidation and growth in Europe for 
the pharmaceutical industry. The number of companies diminished, but the remaining 
companies grew in size. Changing patent regulations were one condition that made this 
possible. A harmonization in which the EU became more and more active.  
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 That the relationship between the EU and the pharmaceutical industry is a good 
one can be derived from many examples, but a very significant one was the Lisbon 
Strategy. Although not targeted specifically at the pharmaceutical industry, the 
agreement did secure a place on the priority list of the EU policy makers. Competitive, 
durable, and knowledge based, the pharmaceutical industry met all criteria. And in being 
the second largest pharmaceutical market, the EU is of major importance to the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 But have events moved in favour of the pharmaceutical industry? With such a 
good relationship with the EU policy makers in such an important market I would think 
they did.  
 
 With the third part of the thesis the case study became the focus once again. The 
differences between the Member States on animal testing legislation are slowly 
decreasing, but still apparent. The way to work towards more harmonization for the EU 
was to establish ECHA and give them the necessary tools and powers. This institution, 
however, would be nowhere without REACH. The agreement in which Member States 
have determined the way they want to regulate chemical substances. Animal testing is a 
part of that. What makes this construction interesting is that through delegating powers 
away from the EC the process is taken further away from the public. The policy process 
has thereby become less democratic. A complaint that has been heard about comitology 
for years.  
 The pharmaceutical industries position is very close to what the EC tries to 
accomplish. With the 3Rs as guiding principles moving towards a situation which no 
longer requires the testing of chemicals on live animals. The question is then what do 
their opponents want.  
 A very large group of stakeholders is represented in EPAA, like the pharmaceutical 
industry. But especially NGOs do not agree enough with EPAA to join. Within that group 
there seem to be two sub groups. The biggest of these two does not disagree with the 
stakeholders that have joined EPAA, but would like to see more and faster progress. The 
second group, with stakeholders like ECEAE, Eurogroup for Animals and HSI, is much 
more impatient. They see animal testing as a necessity that needs to be replaced as soon 
as possible. Preferably yesterday.  
 ECHA plays a key role in this case. You could even state that ECHA replaces the 
EC here. In effectuating REACH they try to find a middle ground between their accredited 
stakeholders.  
 
 The fourth part of this thesis has two functions. It not only brings more insight to 
the case study, but it can also serve as an impetus to further research. Let us start with 
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the contribution it makes to the case study. The ACF entails much more than this part 
shows, but the resources it uses can be applied without utilizing the entire theory.  
 In looking at these resources the pharmaceutical industry has a good position. 
Financially well endowed, good informed and with excellent access to decision makers. 
Only in leadership and mobilization of troops they lag behind some of their opponents.  
 When we look at the public opinion the pharmaceutical industry seems to be in a 
quite different situations from the Pharma Package case. In that case there is some 
evidence of what can be reached without using the public. Or when, some would say, the 
public does not care. But what happens when the public does care? What makes a public 
case different from other cases? That public opinion has an influence has been proven. In 
cases like CSR it has changed the policies of many companies. Animal testing probably 
has profited from this, but there is one issue. The public might change its mind. ‘Green 
washing’ has been a very effective way for companies the take the sting out of the 
methods which environmentalists use to engage the public. In the UK Pro-Test has 
turned the public opinion from enraged towards organisations that perform tests on 
animals to uneasy, but understanding. Given that there is not one organisation that 
actively promotes animal testing, while many are doing the tests, is a sign of the 
influence of the public. Most stakeholders in this case state that they would like to see 
alternatives for animal testing, but do not want to rush the changeover. Stressing that 
animal testing should, in due time, be completely replaced by these alternatives. 
Admittedly, this might look at what Murray153 and Rowe154 are warning about in the CSR 
debate. Stylizing the debate and trying to keep the initiative away from the government 
in order to stop or delay legislation.  
 Stylizing the debate can only be attributed to the opponents of animal testing, like 
HSI. Proponents are actually stressing that things are more complicated than they seem. 
Keeping the initiative away from policy makers to delay legislation sounds like what has 
happened to the cosmetics directive. The delay is there, but the policy makers are as 
well. What is also striking is that the cosmetics industry did not have the initiative. 
Thereby making it a very different situation from the CSR debate. The cosmetics industry 
was reactionary to what the opponents of animal testing were pushing. 
 
 With all sub questions answered it is now possible to return to the main question 
of this thesis. How does the pharmaceutical industry try to protect its interests at the 
European Commission in a public case such as animal testing?  
 If I take my assumptions as a starting point there are some unexpected 
differences. I expected the relationship of the pharmaceutical industry and the EC to be 
                                                             
153 Murray (2004). 
154 Rowe (2005). 
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close and cultivated over time. What I did not see was that the pharmaceutical industry 
in a case such as animal testing operates in conjunction with the chemical industry. Or 
that the pharmaceutical industry and five DGs are represented in one organisation, EPAA, 
that formulates one agenda. What I also found, as a member of the public, intriguing was 
that the public opinion is just another resource. It can be manipulated by both parties, 
but that does not always mean that the sentiment of the public is useable or favourable. 
In this case the pharmaceutical industry, and their allies, make an effort to inform the 
public. Initiatives like Pro-Test aim at educating the public to make them understand why 
this morally dubious practice should continue. And while animal welfare organisations try 
very hard to sway the public towards their arguments, the public seems to be somewhat 
neutralized as a resource. Far more important is the access to and co-operation with the 
policy makers the pharmaceutical industry has through EPAA. Very low profile, but at the 
same time quite transparent. This powerful coalition is where I would put my money for 
the future of animal testing.  
 
 Still, here are many questions that surround this thesis and deserve to be 
answered. However, these would be best served with an integrated approach on several 
cases. Luckily there is no shortage of interesting cases, such as parallel trade, direct-to-
consumer-communications, generic medicines, or patent protection.  
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